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Executive Summary 
The UK is experiencing a period of low productivity growth. Although 
exacerbated by the financial crisis of 2008, the underlying trend is longer 
and more persistent. Trend labour productivity growth has been declining 
since the mid-1960s. Conventional understandings fall short of explaining 
the reasons behind this decline. The quality and availability of energy has 
been proposed as one driver of productivity growth. However, the links 
between energy and productivity are mediated by many factors and the 
relationship is contested.  
This report aims to expand conventional understandings of productivity by 
exploring the literatures which relate productivity to the availability, 
production and use of energy in the economy. The report is the result of a 
survey, a desk-based literature review, and a participatory mapping process 
(Boehnert et al 2019). We provide an introduction to key theoretical issues 
regarding productivity analysis and review work on the historical 
relationship between energy and labour productivity. We then review six 
channels through which it has been proposed that energy and productivity 
may be related. They are: 1) Capital; 2) Prices; 3) Energy Consumption; 4) 
Energy Return on Energy Invested; 5) Economic Structure; and 6) Climate 
Change. Key findings and research gaps are summarised below.  
Key finding 1 
There are numerous potential links between energy and productivity. 
• Researchers have proposed a variety of links between energy and 
productivity. Key suggested links include the way that capital uses 
energy, and the way that economic actors respond to energy prices. 
There may also be more indirect links, particularly through climate 
change and the quality of the energy supply. Links often cut across 
physical and social aspects of economic systems.  
Key finding 2 
There is insufficient empirical evidence to prove or disprove many of 
the proposed links.  
• While many researchers suggest that energy and productivity are linked, 
there is relatively little consensus in the empirical literatures either 
confirming or rejecting these views. In some cases (notably the 
relationship between capital and energy), we do not appear to have 
robust methodologies for making empirical assessments.   
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Key finding 3 
Mitigating against the negative impacts of energy use may require 
transformative change. 
• Fossil fuel energy use drives climate change, which is itself likely to 
reduce productivity levels. Reductions in the quality of available energy 
may also impact productivity in a number of ways. Mitigating these 
impacts could require transformative changes in the way we use energy, 
and potentially also a rethinking of productivity growth itself. 
 
Table 1 | Recommended areas for further research. 
Research area Recommended topics for further research 
Productivity 
measurement 
• Different partial productivity measures give different 
understandings of the productive process. The literature would 
benefit from studies of the relationships between different 
partial productivity measures. 
• Many productivity measures use a narrow output measure 
based on market metrics. This dictates a particular relationship 
with energy. Productivity research would benefit from 








• There is evidence that energy transitions have played some 
role in long-run productivity growth. However, there is no 
agreement on how. Further research is needed into the causal 
mechanisms underlying cultural or institutional shifts that 
gave rise to the simultaneous increases in fossil fuel use and 




• There is no robust empirical basis for determining whether 
energy and capital are complements or substitutes. 
Establishing this key relationship requires us to examine 
empirical methods at a fundamental level. In particular 
research is needed that closely examines the core concepts of 
production theory, and the ways in which they are 
operationalised. 
• Likewise, we need more pluralism in the methods and concepts 
applied in energy-capital debates. Currently there is a 
homogeneity of methods and metrics that limits our ability to 
fully explore the energy-productivity relationship 
Energy prices and 
productivity 
• Further empirical research at the firm level is needed to 
examine the effects of the change in energy prices on their 
performance in different economic sectors.  
• Examination of the short-run adjustment costs associated with 
the reallocation of labour and their ability to shift from one 
sector to another due to the changes in the energy prices, 
specifically in the context of emerging technologies. 
• Work to clarify questions around asymmetry and the 
persistence of the relationship of energy prices and 
productivity. 
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Energy 
consumption 
• One way to reduce the potential impacts of energy price or 
supply shocks is to change our relationship to energy use. 
Marginal behaviour changes appear to have limited 
effectiveness. We recommend more research into 
transformation possibilities of the macro-level social 
structures that governing energy use. 
Energy return on 
energy 
investment 
• Changes in energy return on energy investment (EROI) could 
have significant and long-lasting impacts on productivity. 
Although a number of potential impacts are clearly set out in 
the literature, work explicitly linking EROI and productivity is 
relatively scarce. We recommend further work on EROI-




• The services-productivity link. On both an empirical and 
theoretical level, the issue of how services are linked to 
productivity is relatively poorly understood – especially in 
light of emerging technologies. 
• The services-energy-social value link. As of yet it is unclear 
just how great a potential the service sector has to reduce our 
energy dependence. Further work in this area should focus on 
the social structures that drive demand growth for service 
sector activities, and the link with broader productivity 
measures beyond market value.  
Climate change • Systematic comparison of the theoretical assumptions of 
different climate-economy models with respect to 
productivity. CGE models appear to find small impacts via 
productivity, while others find much more substantial impacts. 
• Research into the specific mechanisms by which energy capital 
may influence productivity. There is little empirical work on 
the ways that capital may be impacted by climate change or 
mitigation efforts. 
• Transformational strategies to avoid climate change. A 
substantial body of work suggests that productivity growth 
may be driving climate change. Consequently, structural 
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1 | Introduction 
Britain is experiencing a period of persistently low labour productivity 
growth (McCann 2018, Jackson 2019a). Conventional responses to this 
‘productivity puzzle’ point to the impact of the financial crisis in 2008/9. But 
analysis of the data suggests that the decline in labour productivity growth 
has been going on since the mid-1960’s (Figure 1), confounding both policy 
prescription and academic understanding.  Some of the explanation for this 
decline might lie in new set of challenges faced by advanced economies in 
recent years. For example, in the past, technological innovation has been 
vital in terms of increasing productivity growth, but some economists are 
sceptical of the potential for current technological advances to fulfil this 
role (Gordon, 2017). However, it is also worth noting that many of the 
current explanations for the productivity puzzle have been mooted since the 
1960s. For example, in 1966 Cambridge economist Nicholas Kaldor pointed 
to (and rejected) a number of common explanations for the UK’s declining 
productivity growth. Many of these reappear in the UK government’s recent 
industrial strategy (Table 2). Either we have made little progress in tackling 
these issues in the intervening half century, or we have missed a key element 
of productivity. In this report we explore the role that energy plays in 
mediating productivity growth and ask whether this relationship could 













Figure 1:  Labour productivity growth in the UK 1900 – 2016.  
(Source: Jackson 2019b). 
 
 




1.1 The context 
There are substantial bodies of work that link energy and productivity. 
During the two oil crises of the 1970s, real terms oil prices grew by 221% and 
115% (Figure 2). These spikes in energy prices preceded dramatic slowdowns 
in worldwide productivity growth. Consequently, the mainstream of the 
economics profession began to look in earnest at links between energy and 
productivity growth (e.g. Berndt and Wood, 1975, 1986, Baily, 1981, 
Jorgenson, 1982).  Since then there has been substantial debate over the size 
and importance of any effects that energy price may have on productivity 
growth, as well as the channels through which they may operate. 
The physical aspects of energy provision have also been linked to 
productivity growth. Over the long run, labour productivity growth and 
energy use have been closely correlated (Jarvis, 2018). Some economic 
historians and ecological economists argue that this is because labour 
productivity growth has relied on the use of energy (Wrigley, 2016). It has 
been argued, for example, that the discovery of coal, allowed the 
Kaldor’s (1966)  UK Industrial Strategy (2018)  
“…the nature of our 
education giving too little 
emphasis to science and 
technology” (p. 2) 
“…we have given insufficient attention 
to technical education. We do not have 
enough people skilled in science, 
technology, engineering and maths” 
(p. 94) 
“the insufficiency of 
investment…, or of the 
right kind of investment” 
(p. 2) 
“…we still invest comparatively little. 
Business investment in R&D in the UK 
is relatively low” (p. 61) 
“the inefficiency of our 
business management” (p. 
2) 
“Studies suggest that the average UK 
manager is less proficient than many 
overseas competitors, while 
management skills could account for a 
quarter of the productivity gap 
between the UK and the US.” (p. 169) 
Table 2: Explanations for poor UK productivity growth in 1966 and 2018  
(Taken from Kaldor, 1966 and BEIS, 2018) 
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development of new machinery and ways of organising production which 














Today energy is still sometimes proposed as an answer to the productivity 
puzzle. In addition to more usual concerns, the UK industrial strategy does 
make indirect links to energy. Notably it makes infrastructure commitments 
of more than £30 billion, a substantial portion of which relate to energy 
provision (BEIS, 2018, 2017). This is framed by the UK government as a 
massive investment in renewable energy in response to climate change. 
Climate change is an important part of the context for this report. The global 
energy system relies heavily on fossil fuels. Figure 3 shows that between 
1900 and 2014, global use of all fossil fuels has grown dramatically. Use of 
fossil fuels is a key driver of climate change. Climate change has been linked 
to negative impacts on productivity growth (e.g. Kahn et al., 2019), and 
through this relation to broader macro-economic challenges (Dafermos et 
al., 2017, Lamperti et al., 2018). In addition, avoiding catastrophic climate 
change requires a huge shift in the energy base of both the British and global 
economy (Wrigley, 2016, Smil, 2017, UK Committee on Climate Change, 
2019). Consequently, if there is a link between the supply and use of energy, 
Figure 2: Annual growth rates in the average spot price of Brent, Dubai and West Texas 
Intermediate crude oil, equally weighed. 
Data from World Bank Commodity Price Data (The Pink Sheet). 
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1.2 This Report 
The links between energy, energy prices, and productivity are not clear cut. 
This is because these relations are mediated by many factors, anyone of 
which may disrupt, hide or enhance links between the three concepts. 
Various authors have wrestled with the numerous political, cultural and 
social factors that mediate physical and economic components of an energy-
productivity link (Jackson, 2019b, Berndt and Wood, 1986, Georgescu-
Roegen, 1979, Mohaddes and Pesaran, 2016, Kallis and Sager, 2017). 
However, there is in general a split between those communities that focus 
on the physical aspects of energy and its relation to the economy, and those 
that focus on factors such as politics and price (Kallis and Sager, 2017). In 
this report we aim to map the wide ranging literatures on each of these areas 
and point to possible connections between the two. 
At a workshop held in the summer of 2019, we brought together researchers 
from a wide range of disciplines to discuss the energy-productivity 
relationship. What emerged was a complex picture of productivity and 
energy as interconnected.  Participants felt that productivity was a function 
of social structures (such as technology, the state, markets and the financial 
system), subjective interpersonal and cultural beliefs (such as the 
Figure 3: Primary energy use by carrier 1900-2014.  
Data from De Stercke (2014) 
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expectations of economic actors and the collective construction of social 
value) and the physical characteristics of the energy supply and its 
interaction with the environment.  The discussion was used as the basis for 
a visual representation (giga-map) of the relationship between energy and 
productivity (Boehnert et al 2019). 
In this report we set this picture in the context of the existing literature. 
Section 2 sets out key theoretical links between energy and productivity 
measurements. Section 3 outlines debates in economic history as they relate 
to energy. In section 4, we turn to the role that capital may play in the 
energy-productivity relationship. Section 5 explores the literature on energy 
prices and links to productivity. In section 6 we discuss the role of energy 
consumption. Section 7 reviews work linking the Energy Return on Energy 
Invested (EROI) and productivity. In section 8, we turn to the issue of 
economic structure and energy dependence. Finally, in section 9, we discuss 
how the energy system impacts climate change and the evidence base on the 
ways that climate change (and our responses to it) may then impact 
productivity. 
2 | Energy and Productivity: Theoretical Preliminaries 
Productivity refers to a ratio of outputs to inputs. Productivity growth is the 
increase in outputs over and above what we would expect from a change in 
the quantity of the inputs. When measuring productivity, we are free to 
choose almost any measure of input and output.  Here we provide a brief 
introduction to different inputs and outputs.  
2.1 Partial Productivity Measures 
One of the most widely used productivity measures is labour productivity, 
where the output measure is GDP, and the input measure is hours worked or 
people employed. It is particularly widely used by policymakers. For 
example, the UK industrial strategy only provides productivity figures in 
terms of GDP per hour worked or GDP per capita (BEIS, 2018). Labour 
productivity also occupies a central place in the history of economic thought 
with Adam Smith (1776) making labour productivity the centre of his growth 
theory (Schumpeter, 1954/2006, p. 182). Labour productivity also plays an 
important role in analyses of the distribution of income (Griffell-Tatje et al., 
2018a).  
Labour productivity is an example of a partial productivity measure. It is 
partial in the sense that most theories of economic production suppose that 
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production relies on multiple elements. This is exemplified by the system of 
production approach, which analyses production as a function of labour, 
machinery, land, intermediate goods, and social relations (such as 
structures of ownership) that surround these factors (Kurz and Salvadori, 
1995, Kurz, 2006). From this perspective, measuring productivity in terms of 
labour alone can only ever give us a partial image of the production process. 
However other partial productivity measures based other elements of 
production can provide complementary pictures of the productive process. 
Capital productivity, measured as GDP per unit of capital, is taken as a 
reflection of the contributions of capital to production (OECD, 2015).  Like 
labour productivity, capital productivity has played a central role in the 
history of economic thought. After the classical economists (Smith, Ricardo, 
and Marx) came the American marginalists. The classical economists 
considered capital an extension of labour, while the marginalists argued that 
capital was distinct from labour and productive in its own right (Kurz and 
Salvadori, 1995, Pirgmaier, 2019).  
GDP  per unit of resource or energy use per have also been used as a 
productivity metric. This is particularly common within environmentally 
focussed fields of study.  Gollop and Swinand (1998) propose a framework 
for measuring resource productivity and suggest it can be used to assess how 
production impacts the environment. More recently, Steinberger and 
Kraussman (2011); Giljum et al., (2014); Wiedmann et al (2015) and Schandl 
et al. (2018) explore trends in resource productivity. In general, they find 
that resource productivity is sensitive to system boundaries and indicator 
selection. Measured as the energy or resources used within an economic 
boundary, energy and resource productivity has tended to increase over 
recent decades. However, if ‘embodied’ energy or material resources are 
accounted for the picture is often more nuanced. Embodied energy is energy 
used in the production of imports that are then used by a given nation in 
their domestic production processes. Inclusion of embodied factors tends to 
reduce productivity growth measures.  
Capital and labour productivity are much more commonly used than energy 
or resource productivity measures. For example, in the Economic and Social 
Research Counil’s flagship productivity project the Productivity Insights 
Network (PIN), energy is not considered in any detail. Energy receives only 
a passing mention in PIN’s infrastructure report (Docherty and Waite, 2018), 
and does not appear at all in their synthesis report (McCann, 2018).  Likewise, 
The Oxford Handbook of Productivity Analysis (Griffell-Tatje et al., 2018b), 
does not have an entry for ‘energy’ in its index. This is surprising given that 
the handbook includes a chapter on the environment, and one introducing 
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the KLEMS framework (the ‘E’ in KLEMS stands for Energy!). References to 
electricity in the handbook focus on the characteristics of the energy sector 
as regulated industry, rather than electricity as an energy carrier. By 
contrast, labour and capital receive detailed treatment across multiple 
chapters and have detailed index entries. Institutional measures of 
productivity also tend to look past energy. For instance, the UK office for 
national statistics provides estimates of labour, capital and ‘multi-factor’ (a 
residual) contributions to output growth in the UK. It does not consider 
















The choice of partial productivity measure is relevant to the question of the 
energy productivity relation because different productivity measures show 
different trends and point us in different policy and research directions. For 
instance, Figure 4 plots the growth in labour productivity vs the trend in 
energy productivity, and Figure 5 plots their respective growth rates. Here 
we can see that labour productivity growth has consistently outpaced energy 
productivity growth and periods of high labour productivity growth have 
been accompanied by periods of negative energy productivity growth.  
Figure 4: GDP/hours worked and GDP/Useful Exergy for the UK.  
Data from Bank of England (2019) and De Stercke (2014). For definitions see Section 2.3. 
 
 














2.2 Multi-factor productivity 
Multi-factor productivity is an attempt to remedy the partial nature of 
indicators such as labour, capital and resource/energy productivity. It is 
derived from the marginalist economic tradition (Abbott, 2018). The theory 
underlying multi-factor productivity sees production as the result of a 
combination of different inputs but says that the contribution of each input 
can be determined in isolation from the others.  
Multi-factor productivity, also known as ‘total-factor productivity’ 
measures a change in output after changes in all individual inputs 
(measured in value terms) to production have been accounted for. Franklin 
(2019) describes the theory of multi-factor productivity growth as a measure 
of the ways in which various inputs are employed. But he notes that in 
practice multi-factor productivity also reflects measurement errors.  
In multi-factor productivity analysis, the individual contribution of a given 
factor of production to output is given by the marginalist theory of 
distribution. This theory says that any element of production will be paid 
(by a rational actor), that value which it adds to production. This is most 
clearly set out by John Bates Clark (1908):  
Figure 5: Growth rate of GDP/hours worked and GDP/Useful Exergy for the UK.  
Data from Bank of England (2019) and De Stercke (2014). For definitions see Section 2.3. 
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“The effective value of any man to his employer is what would be lost if he were 
to cease working. That amount—the effective product of any man in the force—
sets the standard to which the pay of labor generally conforms…Employers of 
capital must pay for the final increment of it just what that increment produces, 
and they must pay for all other increments at the same rate”.  
Franklin (2018) provides an account of how marginalist theory is applied in 
a modern context. Based on the reasoning set out above, different categories 
of labour are valued at their wage rates, because: “highly-paid footballers 
create more value than the ground staff” while capital’s contribution to 
production is based on an estimate of what it would be rented for in a 
perfectly competitive market. In essence we assume that the ‘wages’ paid to 
any given element of production are determined by its marginal productivity. 
Consequently, we can look at how the productivity or quantity of each 
individual factor of production changes over time (because we know their 
marginal productivities).  Any additional productivity gains are captured in 
a residual. We call this residual ‘multi-factor productivity’. 
Multi-factor productivity measured in terms of GDP or gross economic 
output is very widely used and often incorporates a measure of energy use. 
Perhaps the most widely used framework is the KLEM framework. This forms 
the basis of most of the studies reviewed in section 4.4. KLEM refers to four 
inputs, typically understood as two ‘primary’ factors of production, capital 
(K) and labour (L), and two intermediate inputs, energy (E) and materials 
(M). More recently, substantial empirical work has focused on building large 
KLEM databases and expanding KLEM to add an explicit services component 
(S). There are now KLEMS databases for the European Union, Latin America, 
and Asia1. Jorgenson (2018) provides an overview of these initiatives, while 
O'Mahony and Timmer (2009) provide a detailed account of the construction 
of the EU data set. 
Multi-factor productivity analysis traditionally considers labour and capital, 
but can also be extended to other factors, typically energy and materials. 
Multi-factor productivity analysis is the basis of much modern productivity 
accounting. Notably, it forms the basis of the production function analyses 
we review in Section 4.2.   
2.3 Different types of labour, capital, and energy 
It is useful here to introduce different metrics that can be used in both 
partial and multi-factor productivity measures.  A landmark article in 
modern productivity analysis is Solow’s (1957) paper. In this paper Solow 
 
1 | Links can be found at http://www.worldklems.net/data.htm 
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uses a Cobb Douglas production function to decompose labour productivity 
growth into two component parts: growth of capital and ‘technical change’. 
He concludes that 87.5% of labour productivity growth between 1909 and 
1949 is due the latter. This result was widely deemed to be unsatisfactory. 
Despite the terminology, ‘technical change’, Solow’s model left a lot to be 
explained. Solow’s ‘technical change’ (and its younger sibling: total factor 
productivity) has been referred to as a “measure of our ignorance” 
(Abramovitz, 1956, Hulten, 2001, Santos et al., 2018). In order to reduce our 
ignorance analysts have added new components to Solow’s framework and 
made adjustments to its core components.  
A common approach is to add more detailed descriptions of labour and 
capital (Crafts, 2009). One popular form of this is to make adjustments for 
different qualities of labour and capital (Franklin, 2019, 2018, Barnett et al., 
2014, Goodridge et al., 2016).  We have already introduced this briefly: the 
UK Office for National Statistics differentiates between different types of 
labour on the basis of their wages, for example (Franklin, 2018). They also 
produce quality adjusted labour series based on education level (Johannsson, 
2017).  
Capital measures can also be quality adjusted. However, as we will cover in 
more depth in Section 4.3, measurement of capital is complicated by a 
number of factors. Notably, within economics capital is simultaneously a 
measure of income and wealth, and of production and productivity (OECD, 
2009, O'Sullivan, 2017, Mair, 2018). The standard measure of capital is an 
estimate of the value of capital based on what was paid for it, or an estimate 
of its future profit generation. However, in their guide to capital 
measurement, the OECD (2009) argue that for productivity analysis 
measures of capital should be adjusted to better reflect its ‘productive 
characteristics’. Once adjusted, these are known as measures of ‘capital 
services’. They attempt to account for the loss of efficiency of capital goods 
in terms of their production capabilities. In Section 4, we review a variety of 
studies that have used adjusted and unadjusted measures of capital and 
cover the methodology for these in some detail.  
Though substantially less common that adjustments to labour and capital, 
a number of energy economists have developed and adapted concepts from 
the physical science analysis of energy, in order to quality adjust energy 
metrics (Ayres and Warr, 2005, Warr et al., 2008, Ayres et al., 2013, Ayres 
and Voudouris, 2014). In particular it is useful to be aware of the energy 
conversion chain.  
The energy conversion chain describes the transformation of energy from 
primary sources (raw fuels, such as coal), to the delivery of final energy 
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services (such as heating a house), accounting for the conversion and 
process loses between the two stages (Grubler et al., 2012). Primary energy 
is a measure of energy before it has been converted or transformed (OECD, 
2001). An example of primary energy would be coal. This primary energy 
then goes through a number of conversion steps. For example, it may be 
turned into electricity (secondary energy), which is then distributed to 
households, where it becomes final energy. Once in the household that 
electricity then enters appliances where it is converted from electricity into 
an energy service, such as light or heat.  
An energy metric that is analogous to quality adjusted capital and labour is 
‘useful exergy’ (Miller et al., 2016, Brockway et al., 2019a). Exergy can be 
understood as the capacity of energy to do physical work. Exergy is 
independent of the appliance used to convert the electricity into an energy 
service: it is a theoretical maximum based on thermodynamic principles. 
‘Useful’ exergy is defined as the portion of the theoretical maximum exergy 
that actually performs a useful service. It is determined by the theoretical 
limits on exergy and the efficiency of the final conversion device. An 
example of useful exergy is the portion of the energy inputs that actually 
generates the heat warming a house, vs that lost to the area around the 
house (Brockway et al., 2019a).   
Relatively few studies have attempted to use both quality adjusted capital 
and labour and useful exergy. A notable exception are Santos et al. (2018) 
who use quality adjusted labour and capital measures and useful exergy. 
They argue that their analysis shows energy is central to economic growth. 
2.4 Comments on output measures 
Although beyond the scope of this report to explore in full detail, it is worth 
commenting on the fact that most applications of productivity measures 
focus on market output, typically in the form of GDP. For example, the UK 
industrial strategy principally discusses productivity in a commercial 
context and only provides productivity figures in terms of GDP per hour 
worked or GDP per capita (BEIS, 2018).   
Likewise, standard productivity analysis tools were developed to explore 
market dynamics. As a result, non-market activities are difficult to analyse 
in standard productivity frameworks (Griffell-Tatje et al., 2018a, Diewert, 
2018). This is not surprising, most productivity analyses today draw heavily 
from the marginalist tradition, which takes the market as its starting point 
(Nelson, 1995, Foster, 2016, Raworth, 2017). Feminist and ecological 
economists have argued that market starting points specifically exclude the 
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value created by nature and the work traditionally done by women (Dengler 
and Strunk, 2017, Saunders and Dalziel, 2017, Rentschler et al., 2018). 
Where non-market activity does enter productivity analysis, the analysis 
often attempts to adapt market principles, rather than start afresh.  
There are a number of conceptual problems associated with adapting market 
frameworks to deal with non-market goods. As Diewert (2018) points out, 
markets have specific dynamics and there is no reason to believe that non-
market processes conform to these dynamics. Bringing a good or service into 
a market changes our relationship to the good or service (Sandel, 2012). 
Once a good has been commodified we are interested in it not for only for 
how we might use it but also how we might exchange it. Market goods are 
stores of wealth as well as useful items in their own right (Marx, 1873/2013). 
By contrast, nonmarket goods are not typically exchanged. Therefore, it is 
their use or intrinsic value that is of interest to us. The process of bringing a 
good into a market is known as commodification. It is a multi-factor process 
of enabling exchangeability via money. Amongst other factors, 
commodification emerges from the establishment of property rights and 
changes in the logics of valuation being applied to a good (Castree, 2003, 
Victor, 2019).  
A market focus can lead to the exclusion of non-market factors from the 
output side of productivity analysis altogether. A good example of this is 
Firfiray et al.’s. (2018) analysis of the labour productivity of family firms. 
They discuss the fact that many family owned firms have multiple objectives 
beyond production of market value. Firfiray et al., define this “socio-
economic wealth” produced by family firms in terms of social ties, emotional 
attachment, and family bonds. But this distinct form of nonmarket value 
produced by family owned firms is not taken as a relevant output measure 
for productivity. Rather, Firfiray et al., ground themselves in the multi-
factor productivity literature discussed above. This uses market output 
measures. Their analysis then looks at how such market measures of value 
will be impacted by firm attempts to produce non-market value. Non-
market value is therefore positioned as secondary to the production of 
market value, and the latter remains the object of productivity analysis.  
It is notable that the exclusion route has tended to be the path taken by 
psychologists who have engaged substantially in work on the relation 
between wellbeing and productivity. As is evident in our review of the 
literatures on the wellbeing-productivity link (Isham et al., 2020).  Most 
work in this area focuses on ways that improvements in wellbeing can be 
used to improve productivity understood in exchange value terms. 
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Wellbeing is rarely considered an appropriate output measure for 
productivity analysis. 
This is all relevant to the question of how energy and productivity are 
related because the output measure of productivity can fundamentally 
change the role of energy in the analysis. As we will discuss in more detail 
in Section 6, our use of energy can be conceptualised in terms of having 
particular needs met. Markets are one way of meeting our energy needs, but 
others have been proposed (Brand-Correa and Steinberger, 2017). It is 
possible that by focussing only on market measures of output, we are 
missing a key part of the energy-productivity picture. This is visualised in 
Figure 6 which plots energy productivity in terms of both market output and 
a wellbeing measure (based on disability adjusted life years2), as an example 
of a non-market output measure. We can see a striking divergence between 










2 |  DALY stands for Disability Adjusted Life Years. It is a measure of years of high quality 
life lost due to disability. We use it here because it is broadly comparable to GDP, in that it 
is additive across the whole economy (in ways that, for example, self-reported happiness is 
not). As DALY is a negative measure (i.e. a higher DALY means more years lost, which has a 
negative impact on wellbeing), we use its inverse as our numerator. 
Figure 6: GDP/Useful Exergy vs DALY-1/Useful Exergy.  
Data from De Stercke (2014) and WHO (2016) 
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2.5 Summary and Gaps 
Productivity is measured in many different ways. At a high level it is a 
measure of inputs over outputs. Productivity growth is a measure of how 
outputs change relative to inputs over time. Partial measures of productivity 
relate output to just one element of production. This is usually labour or 
capital but can also be an energy or resource measure. Multi-factor 
productivity attempts to present a more complete picture of productivity 
growth. Based on a theoretical relationship between inputs and outputs, it 
decomposes productivity change into changes in particular inputs, and a 
residual which measures the changes that cannot be attributed to changes 
in one individual factor. Multi-factor productivity analyses often include 
energy via the KLEMS framework. 
Within both partial and multi-factor productivity analyses, analysts must 
choose what metrics to use. Different metrics lead to different narratives 
about productivity. When using labour, capital, and energy, there are 
choices to be made around just how these are measured. Quality adjusted 
measures of capital and labour are available. Energy analysts must choose 
where on the energy conversion chain they draw their energy measure from. 
Relatively few analysts use quality adjusted measures of capital and labour 
and  
Most productivity analyses use market measures (GDP, or gross output) as 
their output measure. This means that much productivity analysis has a 
narrow focus that may exclude other ways of meeting our needs with respect 
to energy. Using different output measures may change our understanding 
of productivity and its relationship to energy.  
 
Based on the literature, we recommend the following areas for further 
research:  
1. Different partial productivity measures give different understandings of 
the productive process. The literature would benefit from studies in the 
relationships between different partial productivity measures. 
2. Many productivity measures use a narrow output measure based on 
market metrics. This dictates a particular relationship with energy. 
Productivity research would benefit from engaging with a wider set of 
output measures and associated methodologies. 
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3 | A Historical Perspective on Energy and Productivity 
Amongst economic historians it is widely accepted that the 300 year trend 
in productivity growth we have seen since the industrial revolution is in part 
due to the transition from an economy dominated by wood and water, to one 
dominated by fossil fuels (Wrigley, 2016, Malm, 2016, Debeir et al., 1991, 
Pomeranz, 2000, Hall and Klitgaard, 2012). In this section we introduce 
some of the evidence for this argument, and then review subsequent debates 
over just how fossil fuels came to boost labour productivity growth 
3.1 Energy and Productivity in the Long Run 
Over the long run, energy appears to be closely linked to growth in economic 
activity. Figure 7 shows the close relationship between labour productivity 
measured as global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and global 
primary energy use since 1900. GDP is a measure of the market value of all 
goods and services produced in the economy at a given point in time (ONS, 
2016). Primary energy is a measure of energy before it has been converted 
or transformed (OECD, 2001). Using the same dataset that we use to 
construct Figure 1, Jarvis (2018) shows that the growth rates of global GDP 
and global primary energy use have growth rates that are statistically 
indistinguishable from one another: global primary energy use has grown at 
2.7 (± 0.04) percent per year since 1900, while global GDP has grown at 3.1 
(± 0.04) percent per year over the same period.  
 
 
Figure 7: Long run relationship between global primary energy use and labour productivity. 
Data from (De Stercke, 2014) 
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Although constructing reliable long run datasets is challenging, there is 
evidence that there may be have been a link between energy and labour 
productivity growth prior to 1900. Figure 8 shows English coal use and 
labour productivity between 1561 and 1859. Over this period there was a 
widespread uptake and use of fossil fuels, which expanded the pool of energy 
that could be used to produce material goods (Otojanov and Fouquet, 2018). 
Historians suggest that this enabled the industrial revolution to improve 
labour productivity through the introduction of new machinery and ways of 
organising labour (2016, Malm, 2016, Wrigley, 2010). However, there is little 













3.2 Coal and The Great Divergence 
The question of how energy use and long run productivity growth may be 
linked has been a key part of ‘the great divergence’ debate. This term was 
brought to prominence by Kenneth Pomeranz, in his book of the same name 
(Pomeranz, 2000).  It has been widely used by the historians working in the 
‘Californian School’ of economic history (so named because most of  the 
authors writing in this tradition worked at universities in California, see de 
Vries, 2010 for more details).  
Figure 8: English Coal use and GDP per Capita between 1561-1570 and 1850-1859.  
Coal data from Warde et al., 2007, and GDP per Capita data from Bank of England 2016. 
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The great divergence refers to an apparently sudden shift in key economic 
dynamics. The precise dates are heavily debated (Broadberry et al., 2018), 
but the narrative for historians in the Californian School is that until 
sometime in the 16th-18th centuries, economies in the East and West either 
had comparable levels of economic development, or the East, notably China, 
was substantially more economically developed than the West. Then, 
something happened and the West (principally England) ‘took off’ suddenly 
achieving rapid and sustained economic growth in terms of both output and 
living standards.  
Pomeranz (2000) follows historical demographer EA Wrigley (2016, 2010, 
2013) in explaining why coal must have been important: to run the 
machinery required for the industrial revolution in England, would have 
required around a huge amount of forest over and above that which existed 
in Britain at the time. Pomeranz suggests that somewhere between an 
additional 15 and 21 million acres (equivalent to about 25-35% of the total 
area of Britain).  Pomeranz notes that the use of coal required machinery, 
such as the steam engine, and well-developed markets in order to 
incentivise use of machinery to increase output. Both these conditions were 
met in parts of China as well as Britain. The key difference in Pomeranz’s 
(2000) narrative is one of “geographic accident” (p.62).  
Pomeranz (2000) argues that the great divergence can in large part be 
explained in terms of how easy it was to access coal deposits. In his narrative, 
British coal mines were located close to water which made the coal relatively 
easy and cheap to transport. Moreover, coal deposits in Britain were 
geographically very close to commercial centres. On the other hand, major 
coal deposits in China were located a long way from commercial centres and 
away from water transport. Pomeranz also argues that the location of coal 
deposits in China meant that they were so arid that they threatened to 
spontaneously combust. By contrast the climatic challenge faced by British 
coal mines was that they were wet and had to have water pumped out of 
them – a much simpler task. However, Pomeranz’s account of the role of 
coal is far from accepted. A number of others argue that ease of access was 
less important than the social context of the coal. 
De Vries (2001) critiques Pomeranz for ignoring the role of culture almost 
entirely. Resources like Coal, de Vries argues, only become ‘resources’ by 
virtue of their social context, otherwise they just remain in the ground, 
unused (2010, 2001). For de Vries, it is not enough to explain why it was 
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more convenient for Britain to use coal, than it was for China. What is 
needed is an account of why either of Britain or China would recognise coal 
as a resource to be used in the first place. Two such accounts are found in 
alternative perspectives on the development of capitalism. 
On such account is found in McCloskey (2010). For McCloskey the central 
driver of the great divergence was what she calls the cultural shift towards 
what “bourgeois values” in England.  This value shift meant that 
entrepeneurs went from being looked down upon, to being highly-respected. 
McCloskey argues that this shift in cultural opinion made it attractive to be 
an entrepreneur, and in turn this injected the dynamism into the British 
economy which was necessary for the widespread uptake of fossil fuel 
energy sources. 
An alternative perspective is found in Marxist works that position the 
consolidation of capitalist social relations as the central turning point in 
how energy was used.  For Malm (2016), fossil fuels came to be used in a big 
way because they offered new tools of social control. Unlike the relatively 
distributed energy provided by wood and water, fossil fuels required large 
scale, highly centralised production to work effectively. Consequently, fossil 
fuels offered not only a direct productivity improvement by providing more 
energy output per unit of fuel, but also enabled new organisational forms, 
such as factories. Under these new ways of organising the workforce, Malm 
argues, workers could be more actively controlled and managed and 
therefore made more productive. 
On the other hand, Debeir (1991) and Mair (2019) both argue that the central 
way that capitalist markets drove fossil fuel use was by creating a context in 
which there was pressure and incentives for firm to grow their productivity 
and expand their production. In these accounts capitalist markets force 
firms to compete on the cost and scale of production and fossil fuels proved 
a useful means to this end. By contrast, in pre-capitalist China the use of 
coal had a different social context and consequently:  
“…did not create new social needs, did not constantly push the borders of its 
own market outwards...proto-industrialisation and economic growth were 
remarkable achievements but failed to generate an accelerated division of 
labour.” (Debeir et al., 1991). 
In the accounts of Debeir et al. (1997), Mair (2019), McCloskey (2010), and 
Malm (2016) there is a cultural shift that comes with the rise of capitalism 
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and this new culture drives fossil fuel use into productivity growth. However, 
there are other accounts that see the channelling of fossil fuels into 
productivity growth as a more organic process. 
For Allen (2009) fossil fuel use boosted labour productivity growth because 
of the relative cost of labour and coal in pre-industrial England. According 
to Allen, wages in Britain were relatively high compared to the price of coal, 
whereas in China, this relationship was reversed.  In Britain, Allen argues, 
the unique combination of high wages and cheap energy incentivised 
innovation that would reduce the amount of labour used in production at 
the expense of the relatively cheaper factor of production: coal. 
Finally, we turn to Parthasarathi (2011) who emphasises the role of the state 
in his discussion of why coal became widely used in Britain but not China. 
For Parthasarathi the key difference between Chinese and British coal use 
was the attitude and goals of the two states. In Britain, he argues, coal had 
become an essential commodity for the population of Lodon, where it was 
used extensively to heat homes. At the same time, coal was used in the 
manufacture of military equipment. These two facts meant that the British 
state actively intervened in the British coal industry to ensure its continued 
production and to discourage its export. By contrast, Parthasarathi argues 
that in China the state did little to support the use of coal. Consequently, in 
Parthasarathi’s account it was active state intervention on the part of Britain 
that lead to widespread coal use and productivity growth 
3.2 Summary and Gaps 
Long run datasets suggest a correlation between energy use and labour 
productivity. Economic historians are in broad agreement that the 
transition from an economy based on water and wood, to one based on fossil 
fuels was key to driving labour productivity growth.  
Disagreement comes in analysis of why there is a correlation between energy 
use and labour productivity growth over the long run. Factors that have been 
suggested by economic historians include socio-economic shifts like the rise 
of capitalist markets, or changes in the social status of entrepreneurs. 
Alternatively, others see the link as an organic outgrowth of pre-existing 
systems. In these narratives the sudden uptake of fossil fuels is down to 
factors such as relative price differentials (energy being cheaper than 
labour), or choices made by the state.  There is no consensus position on the 
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defining factor in the long run relation between energy and labour 
productivity. 
 
Based on the literature we suggest further research on to the causal 
mechanisms underlying cultural or institutional shifts that led to the 
increase in fossil fuel use and productivity growth.  
4 | Capital as an energy-productivity mediator 
Ecological Economist Herman Daly writes that: “physical capital is essentially 
matter that is capable of trapping energy and channelling it to human purposes” 
(Daly, 1968, p. 397). If this is the case, we would expect capital productivity 
to be impacted by changes in the energy supply, or in the way that an 
existing energy supply is used. In this section we elaborate these 
mechanisms in more detail and evaluate the evidence to support them. 
4.1 Capital and Energy: substitutes or complements? 
One of the key questions in the energy-capital relation is of substitutability 
and its opposite concept, complementarity. We review the nuances of 
substitutability definitions in section 4.4. However, it is worth being aware 
of the headline definitions of substitutability and complementarity.  
We can understand substitutability in terms of both prices and quantities 
(Seidman, 1989, Stern, 2011). Two goods are price substitutes if an increase 
in the price of good A, leads to increased expenditures on good B. Two goods 
are price complements, if an increase in the price of good A leads to a 
decrease in expenditures on good B. The intuition here is that if good A and 
good B perform the same role in a production process, then they are 
substitutes. So a firm will swap one for the other if the price of one of them 
rises. On the other hand, if two goods perform different roles in production, 
they are complements. Therefore, when the price of one of them increases, 
a firm will also reduce their use of both goods.  
This is distinct from the concept of quantity substitutability and 
complementarity. Two goods are quantity complements if an increase in the 
use of good A increases the productivity of good B. Two goods are quantity 
substitutes if an increase in the use of good A reduces the productivity of 
good B.  
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A number of researchers suggest that energy and capital are quantity 
complements. The argument here is that is that capital requires energy to 
be used (Finn, 2000, Keen et al., 2019). Keen et al., formalise the dependency 
between the factors of production and energy as: 
𝑌 = 𝑓(𝐿(𝐸), 𝐾(𝐸)) 
This equation represents an absolute dependency of the factors of 
production on energy. If energy reached zero, there would be no production: 
energy is required for any level of productivity from capital (or labour).  
In a series of papers between 1991 and 2000, Finn (2000) made the same case, 
but restricted the energy dependency to capital alone. In its simplest form, 





(Finn used a moderating parameter so that 𝑈 was not exactly equal to +
,
. For 
ease of exposition we have dropped this).  This can be entered into a 
standard production function:  




Here, again, we have quantity complementarity because the productivity of 
a given capital stock depends on the use of energy. 
Quantity complementarity between capital and energy can be explained in 
terms of the energy conversion chain and useful exergy (introduced in 
Section 2.3. See also: Grubler et al., 2012, Brockway et al., 2019a, Heun et al., 
2018).  If capital requires energy to produce goods, then capital productivity 
is improved by making every stage of the energy conversion chain more 
efficient, because this frees up more energy that can be directed by capital 
into the production process. In practice this means moving to higher quality 
energy carriers (e.g. electricity rather than coal) and improving the 
efficiency of conversion processes (Brockway et al., 2019a). Both of these 
processes help to ensure the portion of energy accessed by capital and used 
to do economically valuable work will be maximised. The flipside of this is 
that decreases in energy quality (see Section 7) and energy efficiency will 
reduce capital productivity because more energy will be wasted (Fagnart and 
Germain, 2016). 
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Inherent within the concept of useful exergy is the implication of limits to 
this form of capital productivity gain. The concept of exergy derives from 
thermodynamics. The first law of thermodynamics tells us that energy can 
neither be created nor destroyed. The implication of this is that the energy 
into a process must be equal to the energy coming out of a process. The 
second law tells us that a given quantity of energy becomes less available to 
us over time, it less able to do useful work. The implication of this is that it 
is impossible to achieve 100% conversion rates from an energy source to 
useful work (Grubler et al., 2012, Jackson, 1996, Cullen and Allwood, 2010). 
Any given task has a maximum theoretical energy conversion rate. This 
maximum has a major impact on the productivity of capital in terms of its 
ability to transform materials (Carnahan et al., 1975). Once we have 
achieved that physical maximum, if changes in productivity are to be 
possible, they must come from increasing the value of goods and services in 
intangible ways. Here we have an interaction between social and physical 
that is hard to separate and has been underexplored in economics. On the 
other hand, energy and capital may be quantity substitutes. If old capital is 
upgraded or replaced with new capital that is able to use energy more 
efficiently, then energy use will decline, and capital productivity may 
increase.  Energy still plays a central role in production via capital in this 
context, but the behavioural relations around this energy use are changed.  
Price substitutability plays a different role to quantity complementarity in 
the energy-productivity relation. If energy and capital are price 
complements, then an increase in the price of energy will reduce the demand 
for capital. This is central to the discussion in Section 5, but in brief, if 
energy price increases reduce demand for capital this amounts to a 
reduction in investment. There is a literature which suggests this could lead 
to recession. On the other hand, if energy and capital are price substitutes 
then an increase in energy prices should prompt an increase in capital 
productivity. This is explained by Broadstock et al., (2007) in engineering 
terms: as energy prices rise there is an incentive to use more energy efficient 
forms of capital. 
In summary, whether energy and capital are complements in either the 
quantity or price terms this has implications for productivity. The question 
is, are they substitutes or complements? 
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4.2 Do empirical studies find energy and capital to be substitutes or 
complements? 
There is no conclusive empirical position on the relation between energy 
and capital. In their comprehensive review, Broadstock et al., (2007) report 
that 20% of studies find a complementary relation, 20% are inconclusive and 
around 60% find a substitutability relation. Around half of the latter studies 
(35% of the total) find only a weak substitution relation. Broadstock et al., 
(p.67) conclude that  
“energy and capital appear at best to be weak substitutes … and possibly may 
be complements … But very little confidence can be placed in this statement.”   
In Table 3 we adapt and update the analysis carried out by Broadstock et al. 
(2007). We replicate their analysis for 52 papers published between 1975 
and 2005. These papers estimate 61 relationships between energy and 
capital. We then add an additional 24 papers published between 2006 and 
2019. These studies represent 45 additional estimates of the relationship 
between energy and capital. Across the entire sample, we find that ~60% 
report substitutability, while ~20% report complementarity and ~20% are 
inconclusive. 
The reason for the diverse findings and subsequent low confidence, is 
because of the assumptions analysts have to make when testing the relation 
between energy and capital. All of the studies in Table 3 use some form of 
production function analysis. Production functions define economic output 
(Y) as a function of the combination of number of different inputs, known 
as factors of production. In energy analysis, these factors are typically 
Capital (K), Labour, (L) and Energy (E), or Capital (K), Labour (L), Energy (E) 
and Materials (M). The assumptions made in production function analysis 
have substantial impacts on the reported finding between energy and capital 
(Broadstock et al., 2007, Costantini et al., 2019). In the next subsections we 
explore how analysis of the capital-energy relation is impacted by: 1) data 
issues (particularly with respect to capital), 2) choice of model form and 3) 
choice of substitution measure. 
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(Berndt and Wood, 1975) Translog Cost Materials Productive Allen Complements 
(Christensen and Greene, 
1976) 
Translog cost No Materials Unknown Allen Substitutes 
(Griffin and Gregory, 1976) Translog Cost No Materials Unknown Allen Substitutes 
(Denny et al., 1978) Leontief Cost Materials Unknown Allen Complements 
(Berndt and Khaled, 1979) Box-Cox Cost Materials Productive Allen Complements 




Cost No Materials Productive Allen Complements 
(Özatalay et al., 1979) Translog Cost Materials unknown Allen Substitutes 
(Williams and Laumas, 1981) Translog Cost Materials Wealth Cross Price Substitutes 
(Turnovsk et al., 1982) Translog Cost Materials Productive Allen Substitutes 
(Dargay, 1983) Translog Cost Materials Productive Allen Complements 
(Norsworthy et al., 1979) Translog Cost Materials Productive Allen Complements 
(Pindyck and Rotemberg, 
1983) Translog cost Materials Productive 
Not explicitly 
stated Complements 
(Atkinson and Halvorsen, 
1984) 
Translog Cost No Materials Wealth Allen Substitutes 
(Garofalo and Malhotra, 1984) Translog Cost No Materials Productive Allen Both, time dependent 
(Hunt, 1984) Translog Cost No Materials Wealth Allen Complements 
(Hunt, 1984) Translog Cost No Materials Wealth Cross Price Complements 
(Westoby and McGuire, 1984) Translog Cost No Materials Unknown Allen Complement 
(Olson and Jonish, 1985) Translog Cost Materials unknown Allen Complements 
(Halvorsen and Smith, 1986) Translog Cost Materials Wealth Allen Substitutes 
(Hunt, 1986) Translog Cost No Materials Wealth Allen 
Both, dependent on 
technical change 
modelling 
(Iqbal, 1986) Translog Cost Materials Unknown Allen 
Both, dependent on 
sector and aggregation 
(Chung, 1987) Translog Cost Materials Productive Allen Substitutes 
(Gopalakrishnan, 1987) Translog Cost No materials Wealth Allen Substitutes 
(McElroy, 1987) Translog Cost Materials Productive Allen Complements 
(Pollak and Wales, 1987) Translog Production Materials Productive Allen Complements 
(Pollak and Wales, 1987) Leontief Production Materials Productive Allen Complements 
(Pollak and Wales, 1987) 
Cobb 
Douglas 
Production Materials Productive Allen Complements 
(Struckmeyer, 1987) Translog Cost Materials unknown Allen 
Both, dependent on 
assumptions made in 
the estimation of the 
translog function. 
(Bjorndal et al., 1988) Translog Cost No Materials Unknown Allen Substitutes 
(Kim, 1988) Translog Cost Materials Productive Allen Substitutes 
(Klein, 1988) Translog Cost Materials Productive Allen Substitutes 
(Gopalakrishnan et al., 1989) Translog Cost No materials Wealth Allen Substitutes 
(Garofalo and Malhotra, 1990) Translog Cost No Materials Unknown Allen Complements 
(Huang, 1991) Translog Cost No Materials Unknown Allen Both 
(McNown et al., 1991) Translog Cost No Materials wealth Allen Substitutes 
(Harris et al., 1993) Translog Cost No Materials Wealth Allen Both, sector dependent 
Table 3: Survey of studies empirically estimating the relationship between energy and capital. 
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(Chang, 1994)  CES Cost Materials Unknown Allen Substitutes 
(Goodwin and Brester, 1995) Translog Cost Materials Unknown Morishima Substitutes 
(Burney and Al-Matrouk, 1996) Translog Cost No Materials Productive Allen Substitutes 
(Applebaum and Kohli, 1997) Translog Production Materials Unknown  Substitutes 
(Casler, 1997) General Cost Materials Wealth Allen Complements 
(Casler, 1997) Translog Cost Materials Wealth Allen Complements 
(Kant and Nautiyal, 1997) Translog Cost Materials Unknown Allen Substitutes 
(Kant and Nautiyal, 1997) Translog Cost Materials Unknown Morishima Substitutes 
(Nguyen and Streitwieser, 
1997) 
Translog production Materials wealth Morishima Substitutes 
(Kemfert, 1998) CES Production No Materials Wealth Hicks Substitutes 
(Raj and Veall, 1998) Translog Cost Materials Productive Allen 
Both, dependent on 
assumptions made in 
the estimation of the 
translog function. 
(Serletis and Kumbhakar, 
1990) 
Translog Cost Materials Productive Slutsky Substitutes 
(Dahl and Erdogan, 2000) Translog Cost No Materials productive Allen Substitutes 
(Kemfert and Welsch, 2000) CES Production No Materials Wealth Hicks Substitutes 
(Vega-Cervera and Medina, 
2000) 
Translog Cost No Materials Unknown Allen 
Both, dependent on 
location 
(Medina and Vega-Cervera, 
2001) 
Translog Cost No Materials unknown Allen 
Both, depending on 
location 
(Medina and Vega-Cervera, 
2001) 
Translog Cost No Materials Unknown Cross Price 
Both, dependent on 
location 
(Truett and Truett, 2001) Translog Cost No Materials unknown Cross Price Substitutes 
(Frondel, 2002) Translog Cost Materials productive Allen Complements 
(Frondel, 2002) Translog Cost Materials Productive Morishima Substitutes 
(Kuper and Van Soest, 2003) CES production No Materials unknown Hicks 
Both, depending on 
time period 
(Welsch and Ochsen, 2005) Translog Cost No Materials Unknown Morishima Complements 
(Welsch and Ochsen, 2005) Translog Cost No Materials Unknown Cross Price Complements 
(Roy et al., 2006) Translog Cost Materials Unknown Allen 
Both, dependent on 
country and industry 
(Arnberg and Bjorner, 2007) Translog Cost No Materials Productive Cross Price Complements 
(Arnberg and Bjorner, 2007) Linear Logit Cost No Materials Productive Cross Price Complements 
(Fan et al., 2007) Translog Cost No Materials Wealth Morishima 
Both, dependent on 
time 
(Fan et al., 2007) Translog Cost No Materials Wealth Cross Price 
Both, dependent on 
time 








(Ma et al., 2009) Translog Cost No materials Wealth Allen Substitutes 
(Li, 2009) Translog Cost Materials Unknown Allen Substitutes 
(Li, 2009)     Morishima Substitutes 
(Li, 2009)     Cross Price Substitutes 




(Stern, 2011) Translog Cost Materials Productive Allen Complements 




(Stern, 2011) Translog Cost Materials Productive Morishima Complements 
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Citation  














(Stern, 2011) Translog Cost Materials Productive Hotelling-Lau Substitutes 
(Stern, 2011) Translog Cost Materials Productive Hicks Complements 










(Stern, 2011) Translog Cost Materials Productive Pigou Complements 
(Stern, 2011) Translog Cost Materials Productive Symmetric Complements 
(Stern, 2011) Translog Cost Materials Productive Symmetric Complements 








(Tovar and Iglesias, 2013) Translog Cost Materials unknown Cross Price Complements 
(Tovar and Iglesias, 2013) Translog Cost No Materials unknown Cross Price Complements 
(Tovar and Iglesias, 2013) Leontief Cost Materials unknown Cross Price Complements 
(Haller and Hyland, 2014) Translog Cost Materials Wealth Morishima Substitutes 
(Lin and Li, 2014) Translog Cost Materials Unknown Cross Price Complements 
(Zha and Zhou, 2014) Translog Cost No Materials Wealth Cross Price Substitutes 
(Zha and Zhou, 2014) Translog Cost No Materials Wealth Morishima Substitutes 
(Zha and Zhou, 2014) Translog Cost No Materials Wealth Allen Substitutes 
(Pablo-Romero and Sánchez-
Braza, 2015) 
Translog Production No Materials Unknown 
Not explicitly 
stated 
Both, depending on 
region 
(Fiorito and van den Bergh, 
2016) 
Translog Cost Materials Wealth Morishima 
Both, depending on 
country 
(Fiorito and van den Bergh, 
2016) 
Translog Cost No Materials Wealth Allen 
Both depending on time 
and region 
(Heun et al., 2017) CES Production No Materials Wealth Hicks Substitutes 
(Heun et al., 2017) CES Production No Materials Productive Hicks Substitutes 
(Wang and Lin, 2017) Translog Cost No Materials Wealth Allen Substitutes 
(Wang and Lin, 2017) Translog Cost No Materials Wealth Cross Price Substitutes 








(Wurlod and Noailly, 2018) Translog Cost No Materials Unknown Cross Price 
Both dependent on 
sector 
(Costantini et al., 2019) Translog Cost No Materials Wealth Allen Substitutes 
(Wang et al., 2019) Translog Cost Materials Wealth Allen Substitutes 
(Wang et al., 2019) Translog Cost Materials Wealth Cross Price Substitutes 
 
 
Before delving into the details of methodological differences, it is worth 
noting that across all the studies we looked at there is a striking 
homogeneity in methods and a striking irregularity in findings. Around 80% 
of the studies we reviewed use the same core model structure (a translog 
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cost function, see Section 4.4), while half use the same substitution 
indicator (Section 4.5). Moreover, as Broadstock et al. (2007) note, there 
appears to be little correlation between specific methodological choices, and 
the finding of capital-energy complementarity or substitutability. Rather (as 
Miller (1990) and Sorrell (2014) have both argued) it appears that 
methodological challenges make empirical estimates of energy-capital 
relations unreliable, rather than biasing them in a particular direction. 
4.3 The Challenge of Constructing Capital Datasets. 
Methodological challenges begin with the selection of data sources the 
various inputs to a production function. These problems are particularly 
acute for capital itself, and the issue of the reliability and availability of 
capital data is regularly raised (e.g. Miller, 1990, Robinson, 1953, Thompson, 
2006).  
Although capital is often considered to be a homogenous collection of 
‘machine hours’ (Keen et al., 2019, Thompson, 2006), capital actually 
consists of a very heterogeneous collection of goods. The System of National 
Accounts sets out 7 categories of capital asset, ranging from intellectual 
property (which includes original literary works) to Machinery and 
Equipment (European Comission et al., 2008, p. 203). A key challenge in 
estimating a capital dataset is how we aggregate across these very different 
goods (Robinson, 1953).  
Some studies attempt to navigate the heterogeneity issue by using more 
specific definitions of capital. Tovar and Iglesias (2013) use two categories 
of capital: buildings and machinery. They take the market value of each and 
then divide this by a price deflator. Similarly, Nguyen and Streitwieser, (1997) 
use the book values (the price paid by the firm) of buildings and structures, 
and machinery. This approach this does not appear give a decisive answer 
on the question of whether energy and capital are complements or 
substitutes: Tovar and Iglesias (2013) find a complementary relation, 
Nguyen and Streitwieser, (1997) report that energy and capital are 
substitutes. 
In Section 2.4 we introduced the idea that capital can be quality adjusted in 
the form of producing estimates of ‘capital services’ – measures that adjust 
capital in order to better account for its productive nature of capital rather. 
This is opposed to using a pure wealth estimate of capital. In practice, 
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studies of the role of the energy-capital relation in production have used 
both ‘productive’ measures of capital and measures of the capital stock more 
closely related to income and wealth. Often there is not sufficient 
information given on the construction of the capital stock dataset to enable 
others to assess which measure was used (Table 3).  
Whether wealth or productive capital measures are used, the most common 
estimation method is the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM). PIM is based 
on the idea that capital stocks are the accumulation of investment flows 
adjusted for deterioration in the stock over time. The process starts by 
estimating the average and maximum life of a given capital good. For 
income/wealth-based measures of capital, this will be done on the basis of a 
relationship between age and depreciation. For productive measures of 
capital stock, it will be done on the basis of estimates about loss of 
productive efficiency over time. In either case the information is used to 
estimate a relationship between the age of capital, and its retirement. The 
next step is to take this information and combine with information on 
investments over time. To see how this works in practice let us look at a 
recent study.  
In their analysis of energy-capital substitutability in manufacturing 
industries in the OECD, Costantini et al., (2019) use the PIM approach to 
estimate capital stocks. They take gross fixed capital formation (GFCF, a 
measure of investment flows) from the OECD-STAN database (OECD, 2012). 
To estimate their initial capital stock, they divide the investment flow at 
year 1 by a constant depreciation rate (15%, taken from OECD, (2009) 
manual) plus the average investment growth rate. The latter is specific to 




    (1) 
Where 𝐼89 is investment at time zero, 𝑔  and 𝑑 are the sector specific growth 
and depreciation rates. The capital stock in subsequent time periods is: 
	𝐾8 = 𝐾8=>(1 − 𝑑) + 𝐼8   (2) 
Though simple to implement, the PIM method throws up complications for 
analysis of the energy-capital relation.  
Miller (1990) argues that PIM is likely to contain systematic biases that make 
it difficult to reliably estimate a relationship between capital stock and any 
other economic variables. As we saw, the PIM method uses on investment 
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flows and the average lifespan of capital assets to estimate capital stocks. By 
national accounting convention, investments data are measured as the 
average flow of investment within a given time period (OECD, 2009). 
Because of a lack of good data, the lifespan of capital assets is assumed to be 
a function of age alone. Miller points out that two capital stocks can have 
the same average life span and investment profile, and yet have very 
different relationships to other relevant factors. This is because 1) 
investment within the period may vary systematically with other economic 
variables. But provided average investment is the same over the period, two 
investment timeseries with different relations to other economic variables 
would look identical. 2) Capital may be scrapped in response to changing 
economic conditions that do not relate to its age. Miller makes the argument 
specifically with respect to the cost of capital services. However, the 














Figure 9 recreates Miller’s (1990) graphical example applied to the price of 
energy instead of the price of capital services. To construct Figure 9, we 
define 2 capital datasets and an energy price dataset (see Table 4 for the 
numerical example). Both of the 2 capital datasets have the same average 
lifespan and the same investment flow over two timesteps. But (by 
Figure 9: Diagram showing challenges of the PIM approach to capital investment with 
relation to testing the relation to energy prices. Capital Stock A has no relation to energy prices 
by construction. Capital Stock B follows energy prices by construction. Both are equally well 
described by the same constant depreciation rate and investment time series. Data underlying 
diagram is given in Table 3. 
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construction) Capital Stock A has no relation to energy, while Capital Stock 
B varies systematically with the price of energy. The energy price fluctuates 
every timestep. If we only have investment data averaged over 2 timesteps 
plus the average lifespan of capital, then both datasets look exactly the same 
under the PIM approach and we are none the wiser as to the relationship 
between energy and capital. As Miller notes, the data in the schematic would 
not even allow us to test the sign of the relation between the capital stock 
and the potentially co-varying factor. The inverse of Capital Stock B would 
have the exact opposite relation to energy prices but would still be 













4.4 Model Structure 
When implementing a production function analysis, economists 
operationalise a general function by choosing 1) a particular functional form, 
and 2) the factors to include within that functional form. A functional form 
describes the specific mathematical relationship that relates the terms in 
the general function: 𝑌 = 𝑓(𝐾𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑆) . There are numerous possible 
functional forms. By far the most common in empirical applications is the 
Table 4: Constructed Datasets showing challenges of the PIM approach to capital investment 
with relation to testing the relation to energy prices. In line with National Accounting 
Convention, available investment data is the average investment flow in the period. Depreciation 
rate is 0.5. Capital Stock A has no relation to energy prices by construction. Capital Stock B follows 
energy prices. Both are equally well described by a constant depreciation rate of 0.5 and average 
investment flow data of 0.3 and would look identical under a PIM construction. 
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translog functional form (Table 3). On the other hand, CES functions are 
common in macroeconomic models incorporating energy use. Brockway et 
al., (2017) provide a comprehensive overview of the estimation and 
implications of CES functions in energy-economy models. Other possible 
choices include the Cobb Douglas, the Box-Cox and the Leontief. We avoid 
an in-depth discussion of the mathematics of the various forms here. 
Broadstock et al., (2007) provide introductions to the Translog, Cobb 
Douglas and the CES. 
The Translog functional form was developed by Christensen et al., (1973) as 
a response to concerns that other functional forms may be too restrictive 
when analyses move beyond 2 factors of production. Both CES and Cobb 
Douglas functional forms place restrictions on substitutability between 
factors. Notably they require nesting of factors. Nesting emulates a two-
stage decision making process. Producers are assumed to make a decision 
about the mix of two factors and then make a decision about the third. This 
implies two sets of substitution parameters. One between the first two 
factors and one between their composite and the third production factor 
(Broadstock et al., 2007). Nesting structures can have an impact on 
estimates of substitutability/complementarity of factors (Broadstock et al., 
2007, Brockway et al., 2017, Frondel and Schmidt, 2002). An advantage of 
the translog form is that it does not require nesting. However, it is still 
sensitive to certain assumptions. One such issue arises from the practical 
implementation of the function, which is typically as a cost function rather 
than a production function (Table 3). 
Where a production function models output in terms of physical quantities, 
a cost function models it in terms of cost shares.  The translog cost function 
is obtainable from the production function under neoclassical assumptions. 
If firms are (in the neoclassical sense) rational, and markets competitive so 
that factors of production rapidly move to their long-term equilibrium 
positions, then it is possible to the production function to a cost function 
(Broadstock et al., 2007).  The cost function is generally preferred by analysts 
(Table 3). 
The first issue with using the translog cost function is that its underpinning 
neoclassical assumptions are highly contested. Many economists believe 
that firms are not ‘rational’ and that the economy is rarely (if ever) in 
equilibrium (e.g. Lavoie, 2014). Consequently, a cost function need not be 
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related to a production function, and the estimated substitutability may be 
suspect.  
Cost shares may bring an additional consideration. Cross-price, Allen and 
Morishima substitutability coefficients (see section 4.5) estimated with a 
translog cost function are sensitive to the relative size of the cost shares of 
each factor (Broadstock et al., 2007, Frondel and Schmidt, 2002). Frondel 
and Schmidt (2002) argue that in energy-capital, energy and capital are more 
likely to appear complements if the relative size of the energy and capital 
cost shares are both relatively large. On the other hand, if their cost shares 
are small, they are more likely to appear to be substitutes. The concern is 
that the relative cost shares of energy and capital will decline as more factors 
are included in the analysis. The majority of studies are either 3 sector (K,L,E) 
or 4 sector (K,L,E,M).  
However, the importance of the effect of the number of sectors is disputed. 
In their meta-analysis Koetse et al., (2008) use a dummy variable to account 
for the effect of including or not including a materials sector. They find that 
this does not have a significant impact on the size of substitutability 
parameters. In Table 3 we highlight whether models include a materials 
sector. In our survey we identified 46 translog models that include materials. 
38% of these find substitutability, 40% find complements and 20% are 
inconclusive. So in our sample, including an additional sector gives a higher 
proportion of complementarity than the full sample average, which is the 
opposite of the concern raised by earlier analysts.  
4.5 The focus of the model 
An additional problem with issues of substitutability is that the term itself 
has numerous different definitions. Opening this section, we pointed to the 
difference between price substitutes and quantity substitutes. However, the 
differences go beyond this. In a review article, Stern (2011) suggests a 
typology of substitution measures that distinguishes substitution measures 
on the basis of whether they are price measures or quantity measures and a 
number of other factors including whether the measure allows for changes 
in output (gross), or whether output is held constant (net). Here we discuss 
the three most commonly used measures:  Allen-Uzawa, Cross-Price or 
Morishima elasticities of substitution. We avoid mathematical detail which 
can be found in Broadstock et al., (2007) and Stern (2011). 
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In the early days of the energy-capital literature, the most widely used 
measure of substitution was the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution 
(‘Allen’, in Table 3). The Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution is often 
referred to as a “partial” elasticity of substitution because it measures how 
the quantity of one factor is impacted by a change in the price of a factor as 
opposed to measuring how the change in a price ratio effects demand for a 
factor. More recently, this has relatively fallen out of favour and studies 
increasingly report Morishima and Cross-Price Elasticities of Substitution. 
The Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution is a price based, net-substitution 
measure. This means that it measures how the demand for a factor changes 
when the price of a factor changes, assuming output is held constant. 
As we can see in Table 3, more recent studies have tended to use either the 
Cross-Price elasticity of Substitution or the Morishima elasticity of 
substitution. Like the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution, the Morishima 
elasticity of substitution is a net measure – it assumes output is held 
constant. Unlike the Allen-Uzawa, it measures the impact of a change in a 
price ratio, rather than one price alone.  The cross-price elasticity of 
substitution can be either a net or gross measure. In its net form it is very 
close to the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution.  
Our survey results do not provide a particularly strong basis for making 
claims about relationships between substitution measure and findings. Of 
those studies that used the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution, 41% 
found substitutability, 33% complementarity, and 26% inconclusive. Of 
those using the cross-price, 38% found substitutability, 44% 
complementarity, and 16% inconclusive. Of those using the Morishima, 66% 
found substitutability, 16% complementarity, and 16% inconclusive.  While 
there is a difference with the Morishima, it is also worth noting that only 10 
studies in our sample use Morishima elasticity measures. 
4.6 Summary and Gaps 
The question of whether energy and capital are substitutes or complements 
is key to understanding the energy productivity relationship. A number of 
analysts have proposed that energy and capital are quantity complements: 
the use of one makes the other more productive. They argue that this is 
because capital requires energy to function. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that energy and capital are price substitutes: as the price of energy 
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rises, capital is made more energy efficient (so less is required). This will be 
important for our later discussion of energy price effects. 
No form of substitution/complementarity has a solid empirical basis. The 
results are mixed, despite homogeneity of methods. Reviewing 106 studies 
we find 60% report some level of substitution (including very weak 
substitution), 20% find complementarity and the remaining 20% are 
inconclusive. The reasons for this lack of empirical evidence are rooted in 
difficulties operationalising fundamental concepts of production theory. In 
particular, capital datasets are very unreliable, and the choice of model 
structure and substitution measure directly impact the results. 
 
In summary, we have reasonable understandings of the way that energy 
could drive productivity via capital. But the proposed mechanisms rest on a 
relationship between energy and capital which has never been proved or 
disproved empirically. On this basis we recommend:  
1. Revisiting the core concepts of production theory, and the ways they 
are operationalised. Finding a solid empirical basis for questions of 
capital-energy complementarity requires examination of our 
empirical methods at a fundamental level. 
2.  Critical exploration of the ways that different concepts of 
substitutability are used in energy-capital debates. The homogeneity 
of methods and metrics used in energy-capital analysis limits our 
ability to fully explore the energy-productivity relationship. 
5 | Energy Prices and Productivity 
Four of the five deep recessions since 1970 were preceded by significant 
shocks in oil prices and consequently a decline in productivity growth (Jones 
et al., 2004). However, there is no consensus on why this happened. Some 
have argued that economies have become more resilient to energy price 
shocks compared to the past (Blanchard and Galoi, 2008). Others have 
argued that the relationship between energy prices and productivity is 
nonlinear.  For instance, Hamilton (2003, 2009) argues that an increase in 
oil prices has a more significant and persistent effect on the productivity 
growth than a decrease.  The reason for these changes in the effect of an 
energy price change is because they are mediated by a number of social 
factors. It is empirically very challenging to investigate a general 
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relationship between energy prices and productivity growth across periods 
with significantly different economic conditions, market endowments and 
behaviour of economic agents.   
5.1 Energy-Productivity: Inflation 
One suggested channel from energy prices to productivity is the potential 
for inflation to drive recessionary spirals. It has been suggested that higher 
energy prices would directly affect the cost of production for sectors that are 
energy intensive. This may then increase prices across other sectors of the 
economy, reducing purchasing power and dampening aggregate demand 
(Berndt and Wood, 1986, Rotemberg and Woodford, 1996, Berg et al., 2015, 
Herrera et al., 2019).   
A large inflationary effect from energy price increases is in some ways 
surprising, because energy is typically only a small share of total production 
costs. Most industrialised countries at the late 1970s have experienced 
productivity slowdown and recessionary pressures caused by increase in 
energy prices of 3 percent of GDP (Jones et al., 2004). A large literature 
suggests that the largest impacts on the economy actually come from the 
way that prices rises impact on consumption, rather than the way cost 
increases directly affect production (Hamilton, 1988, 1996, Mork, 1989)  
The intuition is that energy is directly required for much domestic 
production, and therefore price rises are likely to be passed through to 
consumers so that firms maintain their profitability (Berndt and Wood, 1986, 
Szilagyiova, 2014). This is particularly notable for energy intensive goods 
such as transport (Stuber, 2001, Edelstein and Kilian, 2009). But energy price 
spikes can also have substantial impacts on the price of other goods. A 
number of studies use input-output models to examine these effects (Berg 
et al., 2015, Logar and van den Bergh, 2013, Kerschner et al., 2013, 
Valadkhani et al., 2014). Input-output models emphasise the fact that all 
sectors in an economy are linked: to produce a given good firms have to 
purchase goods from other sectors of the economy. In this way, energy ends 
up as a direct input to all production cycles. There may also be more 
nebulous links. For instance, house prices have been linked to the cost of 
energy used in commuting (Cortwright, 2008).  
Another stream of empirical literature suggests that the size of energy price 
increases on general inflation is mediated by monetary policy (Tobin, 1980, 
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Bohi, 1991).  Bernanke et al. (1997) using vector autoregressions (VARs) find 
that the difference in the response of the economic activity to the changes 
in energy prices is mainly due to the monetary policy response and the 
increase in the interest rate to contain inflationary pressures. However, 
Hamilton and Herrera (2004) using the same method find contractionary 
monetary policy to contain inflation driven by increase in energy price is 
overestimated. They show that the direct effect of the increase in energy 
prices on slowing-down productivity is large and statistically significant and 
that monetary policy has little effect.  
A large body of literature has evolved to study the mechanism, attribution 
and stability of the relationship of oil price fluctuations on GDP growth. 
Hamilton (1983) had an influential work that showed evidence that the 
increase in oil prices had significantly affected the business cycle. He 
showed granger causality between energy price rises, recessions and 
slowdown in overall productivity growth. Later analysis using 
microeconomic foundations showed that any oil price changes would have 
an adverse effect on productivity by causing costly resource allocation 
adjustments (Gilbert and Mork, 1986). These adjustment costs are incurred 
due to the reallocation of labour and the costs associated with changing job, 
sector or industry.  
Based on empirical evidence showing that oil price increases had more 
predictive power for US GDP growth than decreases in oil prices, Mork (1989) 
argue that there may be an asymmetric relationship between energy price 
and GDP growth. This became widely accepted in the literature (Bernanke et 
al., 1997, Balke et al., 2002, Ramey and Vine, 2011, Cunado and De Gracia, 
2005). According to Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) this became an a priory 
belief that led analysts to favour models that found this response. More 
recent papers cast doubt on the existence and size of the asymmetry (e.g. 
Herrera et al., 2015, Karaki, 2018). In their recent review, Herrera et al., 
(2019) conclude that there is some evidence of an asymmetric effect, 
principally for larger price rises. 
There is also considerable uncertainty over how the relationship between 
energy prices and inflation is shaped by different geographical factors 
(Szilagyiova, 2014, Blanchard and Gali, 2008). In the wealthy economies of 
the Global North, sensitivity to oil price shocks appear to be highly variable 
over time. There is evidence that in the UK and US the energy price-inflation 
relationship became weaker between the 1980s and 1990s but has since 
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begun to rise (Clark and Terry, 2010, Baumeister and Peersman, 2013., Rafiq, 
2014). It has been suggested that decreasing sensitivity to oil price from the 
1980s to the late 90s was because of a decreasing dependence on oil in the 
wealthy economies (Stuber, 2001). However, over the same period, 
Baumeister and Peersman found that the US economy became more 
sensitive to restrictions in oil supply (Baumeister and Peersman, 2013.).  
Long-run evidence for the UK suggests that sensitivity to oil price shocks is 
dependent on the diversity of energy carriers used in the energy supply. This 
is because a greater diversity of supply implies greater possibilities for 
substitution (Jan van de Ven and Fouquet, 2017).  
Energy-driven price inflation has the potential to lead to recessionary 
pressures. Berg et al., (2015) use a stock-flow consistent input-output model 
to show that energy price increases can reduce demand via inflation. This 
result is supported by Edelstein and Kilian (2009) who find that personal 
consumption is impacted by oil price increases. Likewise, Baumeister and 
Kilian (2016) in an analysis of a wide range of macroeconomic, financial and 
survey data argue that the sharp decline in oil price experienced in the UK 
after June 2014 stimulated consumer spending. However, this view is not 
uniform. Ramey (2017) suggests that what appears to be a decline in 
consumption is actually other effects rooted in trade. It is also important to 
note that the size of a reduction in purchasing power is not clear Baumeister 
and Kilian (2016), for example posit that the effect of this on output must be 
limited to the size of the reduction in purchasing power.  
Energy-driven price inflation is more likely to dampen demand in nations 
where energy sources are imported. This is because some portion of the price 
increase is transferred from the importing nation to the exporting nation 
(Baumeister et al., 2017). Conversely, where a price shock is domestic (i.e. 
comes from a rise in local energy sources), it is less clear cut that demand 
will fall. This is because the price increase represents a transfer from one 
actor to another but the aggregate spending in the economy remains 
constant. In this case the energy price increase impact on demand will 
depend on the nature of the income transfer. For example, if energy prices 
rise because of an increase in the wages of workers in energy industries it is 
feasible that the increase in wages could offset the increase in energy prices 
and actually stimulate aggregate demand.  
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5.2 Uncertainty and Expectations 
It has been suggested that higher energy prices could have significant effects 
on slowing-down the economy through business uncertainty and consumer 
expectations about looming recessions (Brown and Yücel, 2002). Using firm 
level data, Bloom (2009) argues that energy price increases can lead to 
reduced consumer confidence and a high tendency to postpone current 
consumption due to the fear of job loss and a reduction in income. Likewise, 
using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, Punzi (2019) argues 
that expectations about fluctuations in energy price can significantly affect 
output growth as firms start to delay their investment decisions due to 
uncertainty of the future costs of production, and consumers delay their 
current spending for precautionary savings reasons. As the increase in 
energy prices is sustained for longer, the expectations of its future increase 
are higher and its effect on the marginal propensity to consume is more 
significant (Matutinović, 2009). Moreover, Wirl (1991) argues that energy 
price reductions do not trigger accelerated productivity growth because of 
actors’ expectations that this will be followed by a subsequent increase in 
energy prices.  
It is also worth noting that multiple effects can cancel each other out. 
Baumeister and Kilian (2016) suggest that although the reduction in US oil 
prices following June 2014 stimulated consumer demand, this had no effect 
on overall output. This is because it was offset by a reduction in investment 
in the oil sector. Here we see an inflationary effect offset by an expectatiosn 
effect. 
5.3 Adjustment Costs 
An Increase in energy prices can impact productive capacity by forcing firms 
to change their technologies and or by modifying their existing technology 
to make it more energy efficient (Hamilton, 1983, Gilbert and Mork, 1986). 
These shifts in production arise from an increase in energy prices. It has 
been suggested that increased energy prices will cause a reduction in the 
size of energy-intensive sectors and growth in energy-efficient ones, but 
that this cannot be achieved in the short-term because of the time frames 
required to change production technologies (Hamilton, 1988, Kydland and 
Prescott, 1982). Therefore, we may expect energy price increases to reduce 
production in the short run, creating unemployment, inefficiencies and 
resource underutilisation (Finn, 2002; Brown and Yucel, 2002). Indeed, 
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Killian (2008) has shown evidence that a sudden increase in prices of energy 
due to supply shocks (for example exogenous political events) can cause a 
significant slowdown in the economic performance and productivity growth 
that could last up to 5 quarters.  
Changing production technology to accommodate a price increase takes 
time. Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) show that increase in energy price would 
cause significant disruption to the economic activity and slow adjustment 
process to install new capital with lower energy to output ratio and higher 
labour/capital to output in the short-run. Conventional neoclassic theory 
assumes that firms make frequent small adjustments to their production 
technologies based on the surrounding market conditions (Doms and Dunne, 
1998). However, empirical studies that used firm-level evidence find that 
adjustment costs are significantly large, so that firms tend to wait to adjust 
their capital (Veracierto, 2002, Thomas, 2002).  
Another stream of literature argues that adjusting capital implies significant 
costs, and that these are a major cause of potential asymmetrical effects of 
energy price changes on economic performance (Dixit et al., 1994, Ferderer, 
1996, House, 2014). This is due to the irreversibility of the investment 
decisions (Bernanke, 1983). Moreover, the uncertainty in predicting future 
energy prices increases these adjustment costs, creating a more sluggish 
investment behaviour (Kuper and Van Soest, 2003). The main argument is 
that firms would not be involved in a new investment that adjusts to higher 
energy prices except if there is zero probability that energy price change 
would not reverse and hence firms would tend to wait for new information 
(Dixit et al., 1994). Kuper and Van Soest (2006) argue that these adjustment 
costs have a profound impact on the relationship between energy prices and 
production growth. Ayres et al. (2013) bring the demand side to this 
adjustment process and argue that as the energy prices soar, the demand for 
energy-intensive goods would decline, this might trigger a decline in oil 
prices in the short-run that is demand-driven. This could slow down the 
adjustment of capital and discourage investment in energy conservation 
technologies.  
5.4 Energy, Capital and the Marginal Productivity of Labour  
Kokkelenberg and Bischoff (1986) use a simulation model to show that that 
an increase in energy price will reduce capital stock, reducing labour 
productivity. The model assumes that capital and energy are quantity 
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complements (see Section 4.1). The intuition for how this energy-capital 
complementarity may impact labour productivity via energy price is that an 
increase in energy price decrease the use of existing capital. It may also lead 
to investors to postpone investment in capital, especially if future energy 
prices are uncertain as discussed in adjustment cost section. Finn (2000) 
makes a similar case using her analytical model (introduced in Section 4.1) 
in which the utilisation rate of capital is dependent on energy price.  
Similarly, Brown and Yucel (2002), suggest that a decline in capital 
utilisation would lower the marginal products and real wages consequently 
would drop. If wages tend to be nominally sticky downward, the failure of 
real wages to decrease in response to the fall in labour productivity would 
generate further unemployment (and further reduction in the aggregate 
consumption) and exacerbate output losses. In this way, Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1996) find an empirical evidence that a 10 percent increase in 
energy price would decrease output by 2.5 percent in one-year time that is 
beyond the direct effect of the adverse supply shock of the increase in energy 
prices. This linkage between energy prices and productivity growth through 
declining marginal productivity is significant and long-lived even if the 
share of energy in output is low (Finn, 2000; Rotemberg and Woodford, 
1996). These studies show that the effect of the increase in energy prices is 
extensive due to the long process of costly reallocation of labour and 
revision of investment plans.   
Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) find the job losses following an energy price 
increase to be ten times higher than employment creation following an 
energy price decrease. They also find that that the magnitude of the effect 
of oil price shock is twice that of a monetary policy shock and that the 
reallocative effect of energy price shock (for example 1973 oil crisis) on the 
labour market constituted an average of 11 percent of the total employment 
in the manufacturing sector. This effect would persist up to 15 following 
quarters. 
Keane and Prasad (1996) showed that an increase in energy prices caused a 
4 percent decline in average real wages in the long-run and this was not 
associated with a labour flow to high productivity sector due to skill 
differences. This suggests that energy price changes could deter productivity 
growth through labour reallocation. This process could result in 
unemployed labour urged to relocate to lower skilled sectors with lower 
productivity. 
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Sakai et al. (2019) also suggest that energy prices will impact labour 
productivity. However, they argue that this is a less important factor than 
demand for energy services themselves. In their model the latter is a key 
driver to improvements in how efficiently energy is used. They argue that 
this supports the idea that energy-price relationship is misleading (Ayres 
and Warr, 2005, Stresing et al., 2008). These arguments are supported by the 
results of recent meta-analysis which finds that energy goods are relatively 
price-inelastic, although in the long run commercial energy goods are more 
price elastic than domestic energy goods (Labandeira et al., 2017).  
5.5 Summary and Gaps 
There is broad consensus in the literature that rising energy prices may 
slow-down economic activity and cause losses in real output. A number of 
channels have been proposed which relate to energy prices to productivity 
directly. The most direct effect of energy prices on productivity slowdowns 
is through inflation. Some empirical studies suggest that monetary policy 
that attempts to counter the inflationary pressures of the increase in energy 
prices increase the productivity loss. Other indirect channels that aggravate 
the effects of increase in energy prices on productivity include investment 
uncertainty and lack of consumer confidence due to recessionary 
expectations and job loss.  Adjustment costs are seen in the literature as 
mechanism which could potentially amplify the effect of the change in 
energy prices on productivity due to the reallocation of labour and shifts in 
the production technologies.  
However, the size and importance of many of these potential channels is 
disputed. Therefore, we suggest the following areas for further research: 
1. Further empirical research at the firm level that examines the effects 
of the change in energy prices on their performance in different 
economic sectors.  
2. Examination of the short-run adjustment costs associated with the 
reallocation of labour and their ability to shift from one sector to 
another due to the changes in the energy prices, specifically in the 
context of emerging technologies. 
3. Work to clarify questions around asymmetry and the persistence of 
the relationship of energy prices and productivity. 
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6 | Energy Consumption 
The potential link between productivity and energy prices is in part because 
of the way that our lifestyles are heavily dependent on energy use.  Two 
opportunities for further research are in how we change our relationship to 
energy, either so we need less of it or so that we can manage without it. One 
way to interpret this is as a change in the elasticity of demand for energy 
intensive goods. Broadly speaking, the greater the elasticity of demand for 
energy intensive goods, the lower the productivity impact of a price increase 
should be, because consumers can switch to alternative goods, avoiding the 
recessionary spiral (Herrera et al., 2019).  
The relationship between the country’s income level and the demand on 
energy is very strong and little is known about the effect of policies that aim 
to reduce the energy demand on the economic productivity (Sorrell, 2015). 
The latter study argues that the complexity of the economic systems makes 
it difficult to predict the unintended and unanticipated repercussions of the 
economic policies that aim to reduce the demand on energy through 
regulations and tax interventions.  
6.1 Energy and Behaviour 
Behavioural approaches to consumption suggest that energy consumption 
is the result of certain embraced values, attitudes and perceptions towards 
the environment (Becker et al., 1981). For example, beliefs about the health 
effects of cooling needs in the summer might be different than their beliefs 
about the health effects of heating needs in the winter. Although, consumer 
tolerance for heat and cold might be tremendously different, it is usually 
thought that people might find it easier to stay warm in the winter with 
energy-saving methods (e.g. by putting extra layers of garments) than to 
keep cooler in the summer without using energy -intensive methods (e.g. air 
condition or fans) (Becker et al. 1981).  
The revealed preference theory assumes that consumer preferences are 
revealed by their purchasing habits and define utility functions by observing 
behaviour (Samuelson, 1948). According to the rationality assumption of the 
neoclassical economics, consumers are well informed about the pros and 
cons of their actions and their incentives are clear and they rationally choose 
actions with relatively higher benefits. Although, the revealed preference 
theory has been the main driver of information campaigns and awareness 
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wave for benefits of energy saving and energy conservation that mobilised 
the public opinion in the late 1970s, it did not show neither evidence of 
effectiveness nor impact on habits, perceptions, notions and attitudes 
toward energy demand (Asensio and Delmas, 2015). 
The ineffectiveness of values and information-based campaigns can be 
explained in a number of ways. Sanne (2002), for instance, argues that 
consumers are constrained by structural factors. For instance, they argue 
that as individuals become more productive this may lead them to get 
accustomed to excessive consumption and create commitments that require 
them to spend any additional income. This is called a “ratchet effect” that 
could transform productivity gains into energy-intensive spending. 
Likewise, Jackson (2005) and Druckman and Jackson (2008) argue that those 
who embrace pro-environmental stances belong demographically to the 
higher income and social classes. Therefore, any pro-environmental values 
tend to be offset by the spending of their higher income levels. 
Darby (2006) and Martiskainen (2007) have argued that feedback on energy 
consumption could have an impact on energy consumption behaviours. This 
feedback can be direct (such as pay-as you-go meters or smart meters) or 
indirect (such as historical analysis of energy consumption). Routinely 
providing feedback on energy consumption and savings with its cost 
reductions and environmental impact can affect energy behaviours 
(Martiskainen, 2007).  
Behavioural research divides energy behaviour into short-run behaviours 
which are repetitive and operational and long-run behaviours which are 
bigger and more considered. Repetitive changes in include checking whether 
appliances are switched off or switching to commuting by walking or cycling 
(Dwyer et al., 1993, Abrahamse et al., 2005). Geller (2002) argued that 
changing these short-term repetitive behaviours towards energy can sustain 
long-term changes in the energy demand. On the other hand, Abrahamse et 
al. (2005) see interventions in longer-term energy as having are more 
significant potential for reducing energy demand.  
Consumer response to energy price changes may be a function of their 
expectations around the permanence of the increase, or the size of the 
increase. Matutinovic (2019) argues that if consumers believe price 
increases to be temporary, their adaptive response to an increase in energy 
price might not be instantaneous. Conversely, if consumers expect higher 
energy prices in the future, they might start adopting new energy-saving 
 
 48 | CUSP WORKING PAPER No 23 
habits. This might include buying energy saving cars, installing house 
insulation and having bigger double-glazed windows that retain heat and 
allow for maximum lighting (Abrahamase et al., 2005; Garling et al., 2002).  
6.2 Energy and Societal Structures 
A more sociological perspective sees consumption patterns, including 
energy use, as the product of institutions, socio-economic structures, and 
social practices (Sanne, 2002, Jackson, 2005, Gärling et al., 2002, Shove and 
Walker, 2014).  One way to understand the interplay of these factors is 
human need theory (Doyal and Gough, 1991, Max-Neef, 1992). Human need 
theory posits a finite set of universal and non-hierarchical (thus 
distinguishing human need theory from the hierachy asscoiated with 
Maslow, 1943) dimensions of human wellbeing.  While all humans share the 
same needs, we satisfy them in different ways. The form of ‘satisfier’ that we 
use is determined by our material, socio-economic and cultural 
circumstances.  
Brand-Correa and Steinberger (2017) argue that energy services are a form 
of satisfier. They point out that this means they are subject to both technical 
influences, but also a wide range of social influences. Consequently:  
“the description of alternatives through technologies or markets only is overly 
simplistic, since the appropriate unit of analysis is not the single actor using the 
technology, but instead the community or other larger unit making the decisions 
which enable individuals within it to use more or less energy to satisfy their 
needs”. (Brand-Correa and Steinberger, 2017, p. 49)  
By way of example, they point to collective energy supply systems (such as 
public transport network) that create economies of scale when compared to 
highly individualised systems. As a result, there may be the potential to 
decouple energy use from wellbeing – which others have defined as the 
ultimate purpose of economic activity (following Georgescu-Roegen, 1971 
and, Power, 2004) – and therefore reduce our collective dependency on 
energy use.  
6.3 Energy and the Rebound Effect  
The rebound effect describes how attempts to reduce energy consumption 
in one area increase energy consumption in others. A useful example of this 
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is found in Figure 10, where consumers are being encouraged to save energy 
by buying energy saving lightbulbs, then use the points they earn from these 
purchases to take more flights (a highly energy intensive activity). Rebound 
can be partial, where the additional energy used is less than the energy saved. 
Or it can be total, where the additional energy used is greater than or equal 






While there is a consensus on the existence of the rebound effect, the 
sources and size of it are disputed (Greening et al., 2000). Some studies argue 
that the rebound effect can wipe out more than 100 percent of any 
improvement in the energy efficiency gains which would result in a higher 
energy consumption (Freire-Gonzalez, 2011). Although there is some 
empirical literature that attempts to test the significance of this 
phenomenon and its magnitude (see for example Barker et al., 2007; 
Greening and Green, 1998), this quantification often relies on over-
simplifying rebound the dynamics (and interrelated) adaptive response of 
different economic agents. This is because of the economical, behavioural, 
cultural and other transformational changes that result from the 
enhancement of the energy efficiency (Ramos-Martin, 2003).  
Rebound effects can be understood in terms of direct and indirect effects 
(Dimitropoulos and Sorrell, 2006; Chitnis et al., 2014). The direct rebound 
effect comes from the fact that increasing energy efficiency could reduce the 
Figure 10: Example of a rebound mechanism 
From Chitnis et al., 2013 
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cost of a given product or service. This could increase consumption of that 
good or service, thereby increasing energy demand. The indirect rebound 
effect comes from the fact that an increase in energy efficiency (and 
resulting price decrease) could change demand for other goods and services. 
The indirect rebound effect suggests that energy savings coming from 
higher efficiency and improved technology could results in higher real 
income. This higher real income then instigates other forms of spending. 
These spending could be either consumption of other goods and services 
with energy requirements or investment that could be energy-intensive in 
nature (Dimitropoulos and Sorrell, 2006; Sorrell, 2007).  
The literature also defines economy-wide rebound effects. This effect 
entails that the efficiency gains of energy savings would transform into a 
reduction in cost of production which results in price and quantity market 
adjustments in favour of expanding the energy-intensive sectors (Greening 
et al., 2000). 
There is little evidence from the literature on how rebound effects this might 
impact economic productivity. There are sparse evidence-base studies that 
assesses the indirect rebound effect of energy efficiency improvements and 
the productivity links through channelling this spending into the business 
cycle either through consumption or investment (Sorrell et al., 2009).  
6.4 Summary and Gaps 
Changing our energy consumption habits offers a way into reducing some 
potential links between energy and productivity. If we are less dependent on 
energy, then we are better able to substitute away from it during shortages 
or price increases. There are a large number of theoretical perspectives 
through which we could view the issue of energy consumption. Those based 
on behavioural and value foundations have been questioned. This suggests 
that reductions in energy use may benefit from broader scale 
transformations of social structures. We flag this as an area for further 
research. 
7 | Energy Return on Energy Invested 
Researchers for whom energy is a core element of production suggest that a 
number of socio-physical parameters are key to understanding energy-
economy links. One such parameter is Energy Return on Energy Invested 
(EROI). EROI is the ratio of energy produced to the energy used in the 
production process. It is a measure of the energy available for the production 
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of non-energy goods and services. In relation to the economy, it is rarely 
explored outside of exergy, biophysical, and ecological economics 
communities, and within these communities is rarely connected to 
productivity directly. 
7.1 EROI Trends 
The evidence suggests that EROIs are declining for a wide variety of fuels 
(Guildford et al., 2011, Hall et al., 2014, Murphy, 2014, Brockway et al., 
2019b). This decline is in part because existing fuel sources are becoming 
harder to access. This can happen within a fuel type. For example, as 
conventional crude oil reservoirs are depleted, new sources are increasingly 
located offshore and are harder to find. Consequently, more energy is 
required in the exploration and extraction phases (Hall and Klitgaard, 2018). 
Linked to this is the transition from conventional fossil fuels to 
unconventional fossil fuels. Conventional crude oil has a much higher EROI 
than shale oil because shale oil is actually organic matter contained within 
rock that is then processed to become liquid oil. As a result, it has an 
additional stage of processing compared to conventional crude oil, and this 
requires more energy (Cleveland and O’Connor, 2011). The decline can also 
come because of a shift in energy sources. Conventional fossil fuels are 
estimated to have higher EROI values than renewables, though there is 
substantial debate over this, particularly with respect to unconventional 
fossil fuels (Brockway et al., 2019c). As a result, a reduction in fossil fuels in 
favour of renewables can reduce the EROI of a national energy mix. For 
example, Brand-Correa et al. (2017) suggest that UK EROI has been 
declining since 2003 at least partially because of a shift away from high EROI 
fuels, like Coal, Oil and Gas over this time period.  
7.2 Implications of a Declining EROI for Productivity 
Falling EROI is likely to be a problem for productivity. A declining EROI 
means societies have less energy available for production per unit of energy 
that goes into energy generation. In other words, there is less energy 
available to do economically useful work (Fagnart and Germain, 2016). This 
will impact productivity through loss of energy services, economic 
restructuring and the price mechanism. 
A lower EROI will impact productivity by effecting capital if capital and 
energy are complements. As set out in Channel 1, if capital and energy are 
complements then a smaller energy surplus will mean less energy can be 
directed by capital to produce economically valuable activities, assuming, 
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for now, that the energy supply is constant. This translates to a lower capital 
productivity.  In turn, EROI will also impact labour productivity through 
capital. As set out in Channel 2, through capital, energy is a key driver of 
labour productivity. Consequently, a smaller energy surplus suggests that 
labour productivity will fall.  
Attempts to offset a declining EROI are also likely to reduce productivity. A 
falling EROI can be offset by increasing the quantity of resources devoted to 
the energy sector (Sers and Victor, 2018). As EROI falls we can increase the 
total available energy by devoting more and more of our resources to energy 
production. However, this could itself to impact productivity growth rates 
because it uses up resources that could have been applied elsewhere.  
The evidence for this comes from a number of modelling studies. A 
comprehensive review of models focussing on EROI-Energy dynamics is 
provided by Rye and Jackson (2018). Here we highlight a few recent studies 
and their implications. 
Input-output models have been used to argue that steady or increasing 
economic output in the face of declining EROI will reduce productivity of 
various factors of production (Fagnart and Germain, 2016, Brandt, 2017). 
These models assume that production of a given quantity of final output 
requires a given amount of energy surplus. A declining EROI means a 
declining energy surplus per unit of energy produced. Offsetting a declining 
EROI while maintaining final output requires producing more energy.  In 
turn this requires the use of various factors of production, implying a direct 
decline in their productivity. The input-output structure then compounds 
this productivity loss, because it means that intermediate goods used by the 
energy sector also require factors of production to be produced. This means 
that non-energy producing sectors also have to use more of the various 
factors of production to support the same level of final output for the whole 
economy.  
Similar findings come out of the simulation models of Hall et al., (2008) and 
Sers and Victor (2018). The stylised fact at the heart of these models is that 
the act of generating energy produces only limited value. Generation of 
economic value depends on how this energy is used by the other sectors of 
the economy. Declining EROI requires increased investment in the energy 
sector, reducing investment in the non-energy sectors of the economy. In 
this way if EROI of the overall energy mix declines sufficiently, the energy 
sector comes to cannibalise the rest of the economy, severely limiting 
possibilities for productivity growth. This connects to a more fundamental 
issue with attempts to offset declining EROIs: it may only be possible up to 
a certain point. 
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Researchers posit the existence of a minimum EROI value for the 
maintenance of society. dependent on the methods used, estimates of a 
minimum EROI for the continuation of society tend to fall in the range of 4-
15 (Brockway et al., 2019b, Lambert et al., 2014, Fizaine and Court, 2016, 
Court, 2019). The theoretical minimum EROI to support complex societies 
is constrained by the efficiency with which energy is obtained and used by 
existing societal infrastructures (Court, 2019). Over the past few decades, we 
have increasingly seen slowdowns in both of these aspects as machines have 
reached the thermodynamics limits discussed above and as wealthy societies 
increasingly choose to implement less energy efficient processes such as air 
conditioning and mobile devices (Court, 2019, Brockway et al., 2014)   
Although the estimates and methods of estimating minimum EROIs vary, it 
is worth noting that estimates of current society-wide EROIs place us close 
to these minimums (Brand-Correa et al., 2017). This should be a major cause 
for concern. As EROI values approaches these limits, there will be very little 
excess energy available to support economic activity beyond maintenance 
of existing societal infrastructure. From a productivity perspective this 
means no more energy to drive productivity growth. 
Declining EROI may also threaten productivity growth through the variety 
of mechanisms covered in Section 5, if it is linked to higher energy prices. 
Some energy analysts do expect declining EROI to drive higher prices (King, 
2010, Heun and de Wit, 2012, Murphy and Hall, 2011). The core intuition is 
that as energy sources becomes harder to find, extract and process this 
requires additional inputs which pushes up the cost of production. This is 
less clear cut than the direct loss of energy services. Energy prices are 
determined by a number of factors (such as geo-politics and mark-up 
decisions) and cannot, therefore, be uniquely be determined by EROI 
(Jackson, 2019b, Kallis and Sager, 2017, Herendeen, 2015). Nonetheless, 
some studies do give us reason to believe that EROI could impact on energy 
prices. 
One argument is that the relation between energy prices and EROI is non-
linear and long term. That is the impacts of EROI are thought to be more 
keenly felt as it approaches 1 (i.e. when energy in equals energy out), and to 
be more discernible over longer time periods rather than short term 
fluctuations (Heun and de Wit, 2012, Herendeen, 2015, King and Hall, 2011). 
The key elements of this argument are that 1) EROI itself is a non-linear 
ratio. The available energy surplus declines only slightly at higher levels and 
much more sharply below 10. 2) the profitability of an energy firm depends 
on their selling their surplus energy. As their own energy requirements 
increase, their surplus energy relative to the energy they consume will fall. 
This represents a cost increase. To maintain profit margins, they must 
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increase the price at which they sell their surplus. In a market economy, 
firms must be profitable to survive. This suggests that, absent short-term 
fluctuations, EROI will provide a lower bound on the price of energy (King 
and Hall, 2011).   
The upshot of this argument for productivity is that as long as energy 
generation must remain profitable, EROI will create a price floor. As EROI 
declines the price floor will rise ever more rapidly, making price increases 
more likely and potentially creating conditions for the mechanisms 
(inflation and aggregate demand loss) discussed in Channel 2 to take place.  
It is worth noting that there are two key qualifiers to this argument. First, 
EROI itself is likely to be partially determined by socio-political decisions. 
For example, the minimum EROI of society is influenced by the decisions 
about the technologies used to obtain energy and use energy (Court, 2019). 
Second, the requirement for energy firms to be profit making entities is itself 
a political choice. Nationalisation of the energy network is part of the 
current political discussion in the UK (e.g. UK Labour Party, 2019) and could 
substantially change the financial dynamic described above. It would not, 
however, impact the direct channels described earlier. 
Another line of research suggests that negative productivity effects of 
declining EROI may come from the restructuring of the energy sector driving 
changes in investment and interest rates (Sterman, 1982, Fiddaman, 1997, 
1998). In an economic transition period, a significant drop in productivity 
growth is expected due to “the misallocation of capital”: the changing and 
replacing of existing capital with more energy efficient technologies (Rye 
and Jackson, 2018).  This slowdown in productivity growth is anticipated to 
have a long and persistent effect as both the energy and non-energy sector 
is affected by these dynamics. The transition is expected to lead to idle 
capital and incomplete capacity utilisation, as the result of investment 
adjusting to new energy prices (Fiddaman, 1998). Likewise, Sterman (1982) 
argues that the huge investments and resource requirements likely to be 
needed by the energy sector as it transitions to new technologies could lead 
to “crowding-out effects”. This could suck up available financial resources 
and raise interest rates. In this way declining EROI may indirectly impact 
investment in non-energy sectors.  
7.3 Summary and Gaps 
In summary EROI is an important policy tool that relates the higher energy 
cost in exploration and extraction and the increasing relative shortage of 
conventional fossil fuel sources to the energy prices. Some studies argue 
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that this relationship is non-linear and more significant at the long run. This 
relative scarcity of a basic input of the production process is expected to 
directly impact productivity and reduce both capital and labour productivity 
given that capital and energy are seen as complements. However, declining 
EROI is expected to affect productivity growth through other indirect 
channels as well. Investments in the energy sector in attempt to offset the 
declining EROI might have “crowding-effect” that implies lower 
investments in other productive sectors and more capital inflows to energy 
production. Prices of energy is not just dependent on EROI, there are other 
geo-political and market factors that affect energy prices. Yet, declining 
EROI could contribute to an adverse supply shock and increase in the cost 
of production and contribute to cost-driven inflation spiral and further 
productivity slow-down.  
The literature directly linking EROI and productivity is in its infancy. We 
recommend further work explicitly developing links between the two 
concepts. In particular, we note that potential impacts EROI may have on 
productivity through price are highly contingent on political relationships 
and encourage work in this area. 
8 | Economic Structure 
Changes in the structure of production and consumption that occur as 
economic development progresses are important factors in determining 
growth of energy demand (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Felipe et al., 2012; 
Hausmann and Hidalgo, 2010). Economic development here refers to the 
theory centred around the two-sector model developed by Lewis (1954). In 
Lewis’s model the expansion of the industrial sector was explained by the 
re-allocation of surplus labour from the agricultural sector whose 
productivity could be nearly negligible (Ranis and Fei, 1961). Links between 
Lewis’s economic development and energy can be explained using 
neoclassical firm theory. According to firm theory, the derived demand for 
inputs including energy, depends on the structure of final aggregate output 
(Berndt and Wood, 1975). This means that the relative demand on inputs 
changes based on the nature of demand on final goods and the relative 
importance of each economic sector. More developed economies are 
characterised by a greater share of the services sector in final output. This 
economic transition in the sectoral structure along the path of the economic 
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development affects energy demand and its responsiveness to productivity 
shocks (Yang et al., 2018).  
The industrial sector currently consumes more than 54 percent of the total 
world delivered energy (International Energy Outlook, 2016). In the 
literature, there is a strong link between economic structure and energy 
demand (Hu et al., 2018; Chunbo and David, 2008; Feng et al., 2009). In the 
early stages of economic growth, the relative contribution of the industrial 
sector is high compared to agriculture and services and consequently the 
energy intensity in the economy is relatively high. However, the later stages 
of economic development reflect expanding share of services and other 
manufacturing sectors with less dependence on energy therefore global 
energy demand could fall (International Energy Outlook, 2016). There is 
empirical evidence that the structural transformation from the extractive 
and primary sectors to the secondary and tertiary sectors could reduce 
energy use (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Felipe et al., 2012; Hausmann and 
Hidalgo, 2010).   
However, falling growth rates of energy demand, do not mean that energy 
consumption will fall.  In the latest McKinsey & Company reports, Nyquist 
(2016) and Sharma et al. (2019) predict that growth in global energy demand 
will persist, despite the year-on-year growth rate falling by an average of 0.7 
percent through 2050. 
8.1 Energy use and the Service Sector 
Services may offer a path to reduced energy dependency. The energy 
intensity of the service sectors is typically lower than that of the industrial 
sectors (Figure 11, Jackson, 2017; Sharma et al. 2019). However, service 
activities are not energy free. They still rely on energy intensive activities: 
computers, for instance require material and energy inputs. In the case of 
service-based economies like the UK, the most energy intensive portions of 
the service supply chain take place in other countries. Production of services 
relies on importing energy intensive goods and services (Schipper et al., 
1986, Moreau and Vuille, 2018). The energy intensity of the services sector 
is lower, but it is not zero. Mulder and Groot (2012) find that the changes 
the sectoral composition of the economy can significantly explain the 
dynamics of the aggregate demand on energy with the energy intensity 
levels at the services decreasing at lower levels than the manufacturing 
sector in 18 developed countries from 1970 to 2005.  
 





Whether changes in sectoral composition lead to reductions in energy use 
depends on whether sectoral composition can lead to “decoupling”. 
Decoupling is the idea that we can break the historically observed 
relationship between energy and economic growth (Jackson and Victor 2019, 
Stern and Kander, 2012).  Medlock III and Soligo (2001) argue that 
decoupling in the later stage of development is not necessarily the case as 
the rising incomes generate new demands on energy, and, consequently, the 
shares of total energy use in the residential and commercial and transport 
sectors increase. Galli (2012) argue that any attempt to analyse the patterns 
of energy demand as a function of the stage of the economic development 
should control for energy intensity that rises then declines after a certain 
critical point. However, Medlock III and Soligo (2001) found that the even if 
the sectoral share of energy demand change through the course of the 
economic growth and industrial energy intensity falls, total energy intensity 
is significantly slow to drop.  
Figure 11: Energy use in different economic sectors in the UK.  
Data from (Environmental Footprints, 2019) 
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This has an important implication: if consumption of services rises fast 
enough, it can outstrip the gains that come from reduced energy intensity, 
leaving the economy and our lifestyles just as vulnerable to economic shocks. 
We see this in the case of the UK specifically. Hardt et al., (2017) argue that 
the increase in the share of service goods in final consumption, they argue, 
was sufficient to overwhelm improvements from changes in structure. This 
means that we have to consider the scale of production alongside a shift to 
services as we look to wean ourselves off energy. In France, Mairet and 
Decellas (2009) find that the growth in the economic growth of the services 
sector lead to a significant increase in total energy consumption of an 
average 1.5 percent.  
8.2 The Service Sector and Productivity 
However, while a services-oriented economic structure might reduce energy 
demand, it could also slow productivity growth. In 1966, Kaldor argued that 
the growing service sector was the cause of the UK’s low productivity growth. 
This has become known as the Kaldor-Verdoorn law, a dynamic relation 
between industrial output growth and productivity growth (Verdoorn, 
1949/2002, Rampa, 2002, McCombie and Spreafico, 2017).The basic 
rationale for the Kaldor–Verdoorn law is that the manufacturing sector is 
amenable to factors such as economies of scale, but these are only realised 
when entrepreneurs are investing. In turn this depends on their 
expectations about output (Lavoie, 2014). The Kaldor-Verdoorn law has 
been confirmed by a substantial number of empirical studies (McCombie et 
al., 2002, Knell, 2004, Marconi et al., 2016, Deleidi et al., 2018, Gabrisch, 
2019). Similar arguments emerged as explanations for the low labour 
productivity growth of many wealthy nations after the 2008 financial crises 
(Barnett et al., 2014, Goodridge et al., 2016, Harris and Moffat, 2017). The 
full extent to which the service sector may play a role in slowdowns of 
productivity growth is not settled, but large literatures have grown up 
around the stylised fact that service sectors have low productivity growth.  
Notable among these is Baumol’s cost disease (Nordhaus, 2008, Baumol et 
al., 2012, Hartwig, 2011, 2015), which points out that if wages are linked to 
productivity growth then rising productivity growth in the industrial sector 
will push those wages up. To maintain a workforce, service sectors then have 
to increase their wages faster than their productivity growth rates, pushing 
up the relative cost of services compared to industry. 
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It may be possible to improve the ‘productivity’ of service sectors by 
increasing our use of energy. Artificial intelligence, for example, is 
increasingly being explored outside of routine -oriented tasks and could 
conceivably become widespread in the service sectors (Nielsen et al., 2016, 
Susskind, 2017, Kose and Sakata, 2019).  The energy implications of such a 
transition are understudied. But early estimates are that AI is highly energy 
intensive (Strubell et al., 2019). Consequently ‘robotisation’ of services 
could be another example of using energy to make us more labour 
productive while also making us more dependent on energy. Increased 
energy dependence could potentially exacerbate the dangers posed by 
declining EROI and make it harder to avoid catastrophic climate change. 
Moreover, doing away with people may degrade services themselves. 
One of the reasons that services (loosely defined) are thought to be low 
labour productivity growth sectors is that their human component is 
inherently desirable (Jackson, 2017). Care work and education, for example 
may be possible without people. But they will be qualitatively changed. This 
brings us to the question of what we want from the economy and from 
productivity.  
Productivity in the broadest sense of getting more outputs per unit of input 
could be measured in many ways. The idea that services are low productivity 
refers principally to the idea of labour productivity: goods and services 
provided per hour worked. Yet many other forms of value are provided by 
the service sector. Workers in these sectors, often report high senses of 
wellbeing and fulfilment and are motivated by the sense of delivery of a 
social good (see, for example: Castel et al., 2011, Druckman and Mair, 2019 
and the references in the accompanying report (Isham et al 2020) on 
Wellbeing and Productvity).  
As discussed in Section 6, energy can be understood as a way of satisfying 
our core needs and wants (Brand-Correa and Steinberger, 2017). But how we 
use it to do this is conditioned by the structures of our social and economic 
systems. It may not be possible to derive a low energy, high productivity 
economy if we continue to define productivity as output of goods per unit of 
labour. However, if we reconceptualise productivity to be about quality of 
life, services may offer a useful route to achieving this. 
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8.3 Summary and Gaps 
This section discussed how expanding the share of services and other less 
energy intensive manufacturing might impact productivity growth. Some 
literature argues such an economic restructuring should weaken the 
relationship between economic growth and energy demand. This is 
challenged by other studies who argue that rising incomes generate 
exponential demand on consumption of services, and, as a result, energy-
saving gains the lower energy intensity of services could be overwhelmed by 
increased demand. Nonetheless, in a different social context, it may be 
possible to marry these two literatures. An increase in the share of service 
sector activity could reduce energy dependency, provided demand for these 
sectors is limited. However, this may reduce productivity growth.  
The relationship between the dominance of the services sector and the slow-
down in productivity growth is generally undecided. The lower 
technological intensity of some services and their labour-intensive nature 
might support this relationship. However, the effect of the modern 
digitalisation of services and the introduction of artificial intelligence in the 
services sector (with its intensive energy use) on productivity growth might 
need more examination.  Some literature suggests that the increased share 
of services sector in the sectoral composition of the economy can have some 
other aspects of economic prosperity and generation of value, for example 
service delivery of social goods.  
We suggest the following areas for further research: 
1. The services-productivity link. On both an empirical and theoretical 
level, the issue of how services are linked to productivity is 
undetermined – especially in light of emerging technologies. 
2. The services-energy-social value link. As of yet it is unclear just how 
great a potential the service sector has to reduce our energy dependence. 
Further work in this area should focus on the social structures that drive 
demand growth for service sector activities, and the link with broader 
productivity measures beyond market value.  
9 | Climate Change and Productivity 
There is a growing body of empirical evidence that the impacts of climate 
change will reduce a variety of macroeconomic metrics. Almost all empirical 
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studies of how changes in temperature will impact GDP find a negative 
relationship (see Figure 2 in Kahn et al., 2019). In a subset of macro-
economic studies this negative impact comes about because of an assumed 
negative link between climate change and capital and labour productivity 
(reviewed in 9.1). 
Any negative impacts that climate change has on productivity can at least 
partially be attributed to global energy systems. Energy production is a 
major contributor to climate change. Currently the energy system is 
dependent on continued use of fossil fuels. This is true both globally, and 
for the UK (UK Committee on Climate Change, 2019, Mair, 2018).  
Consequently, use of the current energy system is a major driver of any 
impacts that climate change may have on productivity.  
Relatedly, action to reduce carbon emissions (‘climate mitigation’) is likely 
to involve major transformation of the energy system. Jackson (2019c) 
calculates that in order to remain below 1.5 degrees of warming, the carbon 
emissions in advanced nations may need to decline by rates as high as 20% 
per year, dramatically faster than anything that has been achieved over the 
last half century. However, this will itself only be possible with massive 
investment in new energy infrastructure, which could drive productivity 
growth.  
9.1 Productivity in Climate-Economy Models 
Lamperti et al., (2018) construct an agent-based integrated assessment 
model to explore climate-economy feedbacks. They allow for climate change 
induced temperature increases to impact worker labour productivity, and 
the energy efficiency, capital stock and inventories of firms. Shocks in the 
model are stochastic and vary in size and on which aspect of production they 
impact. Shocks in the beginning of the model start small (around 1%) and 
get bigger through the simulation period (reaching around 5%). Based on 
the average of 100 runs, Lamperti et al., report that shocks to labour 
productivity and capital stock generate the greatest economic instability. 
Dafermos et al., (2017, 2018) develop a Post-Keynesian Stock-Flow 
Consistent Model with climate feedbacks. Climate damages are modelled as 
impacting aggregate demand, and the potential output of the economy by 
reducing labour and capital productivity. Capital productivity effects are 
included by incorporating a climate damage term into the depreciation 
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function. This means that increasing levels of climate change effectively 
speed up the deterioration of capital goods. Labour productivity effects are 
similarly modelled by including a climate damage term on the level (not 
growth rate) of labour productivity. It is important to note that for both 
labour and capital productivity, Dafermos et al., allow for adaptations to be 
made which mitigate productivity loss. The size of productivity loss is the 
net effect of the damage and the adaptation.   
Dafermos et al., (2017, 2018) run a number of scenarios to show that 
proactive green finance packages that expand credit for renewable energy 
and other ‘clean’ projects can reduce the economic damage of climate 
change and allow greater economic expansion than conventional financing. 
However, they argue that green financing is not enough on its own. In all of 
their scenarios, economic output eventually declines due to climate 
damages, partially through impacts on capital and labour productivity.  
Szewczyk, et al., (2019) bring together 5 different models of the relationship 
between labour productivity and temperature (in construction and 
agriculture) and temperature simulations from 5 different climate models 
(all using a high emissions scenario). They then shock a Computable General 
Equilibrium model with each of the 25 resulting labour productivity 
scenarios to estimate the wider economic impacts. Their average labour 
productivity estimates vary between a 2% reduction and a 21% reduction 
though this varies substantially across different world regions. They 
estimate a mean annual GDP loss of 0.6%. Again, this varies substantially by 
region. Szewczyk, et al., are notable for using a variety of labour 
productivity-temperature relations, and for using relationships based on 
empirical datasets. This grounds their model in empirical observation. 
However, tis strength may also be a weakness. Models that rely heavily on 
empirical data rely on the idea that the past is a good guide to future (Jackson, 
2019e). It is not certain that this will be the case with the temperature-
labour productivity relation.  
Matsumoto (2019) also incorporates temperature-labour productivity 
dynamics into a coupled climate/CGE model to assess the potential impact 
of climate change. Like Szewczyk, et al., (2019), Matsumoto finds only small 
impacts, though, again, these are regionally very diverse. The temperature-
labour productivity impacts included in the model are based on empirical 
relationships derived by (Kjellstrom et al., 2009). These relationships are 
non-linear, such that higher temperatures have a larger impact on labour 
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productivity and have a threshold below which there is no impact on 
temperature. However, Matsumoto uses an adapted form of Kjellstrom et 
al’s relation to ensure that there is always a minimum amount of labour 
productivity. On the other hand, Kjellstrom et al (2009) who base their work 
on occupational health and safety standards suggest labour productivity 
could decline to zero. 
Having looked at four recent impact models that use the concept of climate 
damages and their impact on productivity, we now turn to evaluate the 
evidence base underlying these mechanisms. 
9.2 Labour Productivity and Heat 
In a systematic review Levi et al., (2018) identify 36 papers that examine the 
link between heat-related illness and injuries on worker productivity. It is 
worth noting that of these almost a third were themselves reviews of the 
literature, the rest were a combination of simulation models, cross-sectional 
studies and within-group comparisons. From the papers they study Levi et 
al, report 3 key mechanisms: 1) extreme heat reduces working hours 
(reducing output per worker); 2) the effect of temperature is most acute in 
physically demanding jobs; 3) dehydration associated with higher 
temperatures is a key driver of worker productivity loss.  
The effects of excess heat are already felt by workers in hot climates or jobs 
that expose them to significant levels of heat. Based on a meta-analysis of 
11 experimental studies of individuals who work under conditions of ‘heat-
stress’ (temperatures where the body’s mechanisms to control heat fail), 
they report that 30% of all workers in such conditions report productivity 
losses. Zander et al., (2015) use an online survey of 1726 adults to investigate 
self-reported reductions in productivity related to heat in Australia. They 
classify two types of productivity loss: 7% of their sample had been absent 
from work for at least 1 day in the previous 12 months. On the other hand, 
70 percent reported a drop in the quality of their work for at least 1 day in 
the previous 12 months. These results are largely corroborated by for a range 
of other countries and work environments (Table 5).  
The reason that workers in hot climates or who engage in physical work are 
thought to most at risk of heat related productivity loss heat is because the 
total heat in the body is a function of both the ambient temperature, and 
heat generated by the body itself (Levi et al., 2018, Shi et al., 2013, Kjellstrom 
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et al., 2016). The latter is significantly greater during manual work because 
of the heat generated by greater use of muscles (Kjellstrom et al., 2016). This 
leads to workers ‘self-regulating’ their temperature by reducing the 
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N/A  Experimental Productivity declined as temperature increased 
from 26 degrees C to 35.8 degrees C. 
(Gun and Budd, 
1995) 
Shearers Australia Case Study Productivity responses to temperature are 
mediated by behavioural factors 




Not Stated Case Study Labour productivity decreased 5–7%, when the air 
temperature exceeded 25 °C. 
(Seppanen et al., 
2006a) 
Office N/A Meta-Analysis Productivity peaks at 21.75 degrees c 
(Crowe et al., 
2009) 




Sugar Cane Nicaragua Case Study Productivity was negatively impacted by 
dehydration, but this is fixable by an intervention 
to improve hydration 
(Kjellstrom et al., 
2009) 
All Global Simulation Significant regional variation, but all regions suffer 
some labour productivity loss due to temperature 
increases. Notably, 11-27% reductions in labour 
productivity in South-East Asia, Andean and 
Central America, and the Caribbean. 
(Hsiang, 2010) Agriculture, 
Non-Agriculture 
Caribbean  Econometric Labour productivity losses of 2.4% per 1 degree C 
temperature increase in non-agricultural 
production.  Labour productivity losses of 2.3% per 
1 degree C temperature increase in agricultural 
production.   





Thailand Cross-Sectional Workers self-reported productivity losses between 
10 and 60% in the pottery and construction 
industries, but not in the knife or power plant 
industries. 
(Dunne et al., 
2013) 
All Global Simulation Heat stress has reduced labour capacity by 10%  in 
peak months over recent decades. Labour capacity 
is projected to be reduced by 20% in peak months 




Office UK Simulation Productivity is negatively impacted by extremes of 
temperature 
Table 5: Survey of studies exploring links between temperature and labour productivity 
 
 
 65 | CUSP WORKING PAPER No 23 
Citation 
 




Methodology Key Findings 
 
(Kjellstrom et al., 
2013) 
Mainly outdoor South-East Asia Simulation For heavy work, 30-40% of worktime is lost in the 
shade, 60-70% in the sun. Projections for 2050 
suggest that for heavy work, 50-60% of afternoon 
worktime in the sun could be lost, heavy work in 
the sun could lose 80% of afternoon worktime; 
moderate work could see 50% reductions in work 
time. 
(Sahu et al., 2013) Rice Harvesting India Cross-sectional Measured productivity (rice bundles collected) 
declined by about 5% for every degree of 
temperature increase. 
(Hajizadeh et al., 
2014) 
Brick Production Iran Cross-sectional Productivity is inversely correlated with 
temperature 
(Sett and Sahu, 
2014) 
Brickfield India Cross-sectional Linear decline in productivity as air temperature 
exceed 34.9 degrees C 
(Zivin and Neidell, 
2014) 
All US Econometric At extremes of temperature, labour productivity in 
high risk (e.g. outdoor) industries is significantly 
impacted. Only moderate impacts are observed in 






Turkey Simulation Labour productivity in manual and outdoor (e.g. 
agriculture and construction) could fall by up to 
52 % during the summer months between 2070-
2100 
(Burke et al., 2015) Agriculture, 
Non-Agriculture 
Global Econometric Labour productivity in all forms of work is sensitive 
to extremes of temperature. Agriculture is more 
sensitive. 
(Zander et al., 
2015) 
Various Australia Cross-sectional 7% of workers reported at least one day of absence 
from work due to heat stress in the last year. 70 
percent reported a drop in the quality of their work 
for at least 1 day in the previous 12 months 





India Cross-sectional 57% of workers self-reported productivity loss due 




Steel Southern India Cross-sectional Workers self-reported productivity loss due to heat 
exposure 
(Lamb and Kwok, 
2016) 
Offices New Zealand Longditudinal No relation between thermal comfort and work 
performance 
(Lao et al., 2016) Council Australia Case Study Workers report that heat reduces their productivity 
(Yi and Chan, 
2017) 
Construction Hong Kong Case Study 0.33% reduction in work time for a 1 degree 
temperature increase. 
(Quiller et al., 
2017) 
Orchards USA Cross-Sectional Little to no effect when workplace factors 
accounted for. 
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(Ioannou et al., 
2017) 
Grape picking USA Case Study Increases in temperature were significantly related 
to lost labour time 
(Setyawan et al., 
2018) 
Textiles Indonesia Case Study Productivity is inversely correlated with 
temperature 
(Lundgren-
Kownacki et al., 
2018) 
Brick Kilns India Case Study 16% of workers report being absent from work due 
to heat, 48% report losing productivity due to heat 
(Pogačar et al., 
2018) 
Manufacturing Slovenia Case Study Managers’ report heat stress reducing productivity 
(Zhang et al., 
2018) 
Manufacturing China Econometric Total Factor Productivity has an inverted U 
relationship with temperature. 




China Econometric At normal temperature ranges, productivity was 
not impacted. 
(Kahn et al., 2019) All Global Econometric Productivity is negatively impacted by deviation 
from historical temperature norms 
(Orlov et al., 2019) Agriculture, 
Construction 
Europe Case Study In the heat waves of 2003, 2010 and 2015, Europe 
saw average economic losses of $59-90 per worker 




Various Malaysia Cross-sectional Workers reported to have reduced work capacity on 
a median of 29 days in a year. On these days they 
felt that their work capacity was at least halved. 
 
 
Across all the studies reviewed, there is a generally accepted relationship 
that extremes of heat are negatively associated with productivity, but the 
evidence supporting this less robust for indoor workers in temperate 
climates. Of the 33 studies surveyed in Table 5, six specifically consider 
office workers and three explicitly consider temperate regions. Another 6 
are macro level studies with no specific sectoral or geographical focus. Of 
these Zivin and Chang (2014) report smaller effects for indoor workers, while 
Lamb and Kwok (2016) and Chang et al., (2019) find no relation between 
temperature and work performance for office workers. This is attributed to 
the ability to control an indoor climate. On the other hand, three studies 
report that any change in temperature deviation from the ideal or norm is 
negative (Kahn et al., 2019, Kershaw and Lash, 2013, Seppanen et al., 2006b). 
The most recent of these, Kahn et al., (2019) construct and test a theoretical 
model linking changes in labour productivity growth to deviations in local 
temperatures. They calibrate the model using data from 1960-2014 and find 
that any deviation from local temperatures negatively effects labour 
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productivity growth, regardless of the income level of temperature base of 
the country under consideration. 
Although there is a general consensus that temperature impacts 
productivity, several authors stress that this is not a straight-forward 
relationship. One proposed reason for this is the role that context plays in 
mediating exposure to heat and the capacity for adaptation. Gun et al., (1995) 
note that responses to heat capacity are often determined by personal or 
behavioural factors. In their study of sheep-shearers, in Australia they 
report that the weight and alcohol intake are important factors in mediating 
the effects of heat stress. Likewise, based on a review of the literature, Heal 
and Park (2016) suggest that although the short run effects of heat exposure 
on productivity are well established there is little evidence on how long run 
adaptations may be used to mitigate these effects. It is worth noting, 
however, that some researchers are sceptical of our ability to adapt. 
Kjellstrom et al (2016) argue that some forms of work will be very difficult 
to adapt with current technologies. For example, they point out that work 
outdoors or in large indoor environments will be hard to air condition. Day 
et al., (2019) are more optimistic suggesting that we have access to a wide 
range of options beyond air conditioning. They suggest optimisation of 
working hours to avoid peak temperatures, and for climate change induced 
heat to accounted for in urban planning and building design. 
9.3 Capital Productivity and Climate Change 
The direct effects on capital productivity from climate change are in general 
less well studied than those on labour productivity. However, several 
mechanisms have been proposed. A number of authors suggest that capital 
stock may be directly damaged or destroyed by extreme weather events or 
by being left unused (Fankhauser et al., 1999, Dietz and Stern, 2015, Rezai 
et al., 2018).  
The stranded assets thesis concerns how we manage the large amounts of 
capital currently tied up in the fossil fuel industry during a transition to a 
low carbon economy (Carbon Tracker, 2019, Jackson, 2019d).In order to 
avoid catastrophic climate change we must very rapidly transition away 
from fossil fuels as our energy base (UK Committee on Climate Change, 2019, 
Jackson, 2019c). This will leave a large quantity of fossil fuels unburnt, and 
power plants effectively useless (Carbon Tracker, 2015). Estimates in the 
literature vary based on the level of temperature increase they consider, as 
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well as the probability of achieving this (Jackson, 2019d). One recent study 
suggests that 10- 20% of the operating capacity of fossil fuel power stations 
must be stranded to remain below 3 degrees of warming (Pfeiffer et al., 2018). 
Carbon Tracker (2015) estimate 2 trillion US dollars’ worth of investments 
that are at risk of stranding in the transition to a low carbon economy. 
It is unclear just how stranding of these assets will impact productivity. 
There are relatively few economic modelling studies of the impacts of asset 
stranding (see Jackson 2019d for a notable exception). However, such a large 
quantity of unused assets clearly has the potential for substantial 
macroeconomic impacts. We can see, for example, how abandoning of fossil 
fuel plants could represent under-utilisation of capital, thereby reducing 
productivity, and also how attempts by firms to recoup lost capital could 
inflate energy prices. Further work is urgently needed in this area. 
9.4 Increasing investment in Renewable Energy and Kaldor-Verdoorn 
effects. 
Over the past two decades, energy trade has increased more than any other 
product with an average annual growth rate of 12 percent and fuel exports 
were more than eight times in ten years since 1995 (WTO, 2015). It is 
expected that a transition towards a larger share of renewables in the 
structure of the energy mix would generate a significant change in the 
energy linkages with the economic activity at the global and national level 
(IEA, 2016). Consequently, a transition to renewable energy generation 
could reduce recessionary impacts of energy prices and knock-on effects on 
productivity.  
The other side of the stranded assets thesis is that a transition to a low 
carbon economy requires substantial investment in new infrastructure. 
Pollin (2015), for instance, presents a 20 year investment program bringing 
investment in renewable energy from 0.2-0.3% of Global GDP to 1.7-1.8% of 
Global GDP. The OECD (2011), suggests that the investments required to 
reduce global emissions by 2050 is around $46 trillion. For context the IEA 
(2019) estimate that in 2018 global investment in energy supply and 
efficiency was around $2 trillion. For the UK, the UK Committee on Climate 
Change (2019) estimates that to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, 
will require an annual investment in the energy sector to rise to £20 billion 
by 2050. Such a large-scale economic program is likely to effect productivity. 
It is possible that this wave of investment in new capital could boost 
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productivity growth via the Kaldor-Verdoorn mechanism introduced in 
Section 8.2. 
An expansion of investment of capital-intensive energy infrastructure could, 
if the Kaldor-Verdoorn law holds, be expected to drive productivity growth. 
The Kaldor-Verdoorn mechanism rests on the idea that industrial 
production has specific qualities that make it amenable to productivity 
growth. Therefore, if investment in renewable technology stimulates 
industrial technology, and the Kaldor-Verdoorn law holds, productivity 
should grow. However, while correlations between industrial output growth 
and labour productivity have been confirmed by a substantial number of 
empirical studies (McCombie et al., 2002, Knell, 2004, Marconi et al., 2016, 
Deleidi et al., 2018, Gabrisch, 2019) such studies are not able to conclusively 
prove the direction of causality. 
9.5 Innovation for a low-carbon economy and productivity 
To achieve a low carbon economy, we require not just the massive expansion 
of renewables discussed in Section 9.4, but also innovations that improve 
energy efficiency, and storage. It is possible that the development of these 
new technologies could boost productivity growth by representing new 
opportunities for innovation. 
Innovation has a long pedigree as a driver of productivity and economic 
growth. Adam Smith (1776) discusses with the ways that the division of 
labour creates conditions for innovating within a work process and made 
this key to his theory of growth. Arrow (1971), building on Smith, placed 
productivity gains from ‘learning by doing’ at the core of his growth model. 
Learning by doing Schumpeter’s growth theory famously relies on the 
notion of creative destruction and long period cycles of innovation (Aghion 
et al., 2013). Endogenous growth theory brings these ideas into mainstream 
frameworks focusing in particular on Research and Development (R&D) 
(Romer, 1986, 1994).  
Aghion et al., (2019) argue that the transition to a low carbon economy could 
bring substantial innovations. They argue that low carbon technologies 
represent a greater potential for learning by doing because they are newer: 
incumbent fossil fuel technologies have exhausted their low hanging fruit 
opportunities with respect to productivity gains. They also suggest that 
there is the potential for spillover effects from direct innovations in low 
 
 70 | CUSP WORKING PAPER No 23 
carbon technology to productivity gains in other sectors. Dechezleprêtre et 
al., (2014) find that patents for ‘clean’ technologies receive on average 43% 
more citations than those for ‘dirty’ patents. On this basis they argue that 
potential knowledge spillovers from clean technologies are comparable to 
those of information technology – often considered a ‘general purpose 
technology’. However, some authors are cautious as to the potential of low 
carbon technologies to drive productivity growth. Foxon (2017) argues 
historical energy transitions became general purpose technologies through 
a complex set of circumstances. In particular, he argues that first energy 
systems had to prove their usefulness and economic viability to a wide 
variety of actors, something that low carbon technology may do but has not 
done yet. Foxon also argues that previous energy systems became general 
purpose technologies because of the way they developed with a wide variety 
of broader institutions and infrastructures that could take advantage of 
them. Whether this will happen with low carbon technology remains to be 
seen.  
An additional question remains around how we might achieve innovation 
for a low carbon economy.  An influential theory in mainstream economics 
is induced innovation. The theory of induced innovation posits that an 
increase in the price of one factor of production relative to another should 
induce innovations to decrease its demand (Hicks, 1932). So, rising energy 
prices should prompt energy efficiency gains. Using U.S. patent data from 
1970 to 1994, Popp (2002) argues that energy prices are a substantial driver 
of energy efficiency. However, recent studies have shown that R&D 
spending in the energy sector in major industrialised countries is not 
necessarily associated with significant changes in energy efficiency or 
carbon reduction (McDonald, Schrattenholzer, 2001; Sagar and Holdren, 
2002; Sagar and van der Zwaan, 2006). In part this has been attributed to the 
complexity of the energy sector.  
The energy sector is likely to be vulnerable to path dependencies. Path 
dependency is the idea that future changes in a system are dependent on 
decisions made in the past. The accumulation of past investment decisions 
that are expensive and hard to change can ‘lock in’ a particular development 
path (Aghion et al., 2019, Grubler, 2004). This is particularly problematic in 
the energy sector because of its heavy reliance on long lived technologies 
(King, 2010). In an influential modelling study, Acemoglu et al., (2012) 
argues that decoupling productivity growth from ‘dirty’ energy will require 
government intervention in the form of a research subsidies and carbon 
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taxes. Aghion et al., (2019) argue that this is because in Acemeglu et al.’s 
model ‘dirty’ technology has a larger installed base at the start of the model 
run. Consequently, there is an existing network and infrastructure in place 
to use the dirty technology. This creates immediate economic incentives for 
profit maximising researchers to invest in better ways to use dirty 
technologies which can only be broken through government intervention.  
9.6 Productivity as a driver of Climate Change 
Productivity growth has itself been argued to be a major driver of 
greenhouse gas emissions. This is for a number of reasons, including the 
social dynamics that mean increasing productivity growth requires greater 
levels of production in order to maintain employment, which in turn drives 
energy use, and that productivity growth is often predicated on fossil energy 
use (Mair, 2019, Jackson and Victor, 2011, Ferguson, 2016).  
One way to understand this analysis is through a macro-economic 
interpretation of the rebound effect (introduced in Section 6.3) As Jevon’s 
pointed out in his 1865 book The Coal Question, there is the potential for a 
substantial ‘rebound’ effect through the kind of efficiency gains assumed by 
induced innovation. Induced innovation theory rests on the premise that as 
prices rise, this creates incentives to use energy more efficiently. The other 
side of this coin is that increased efficiency reduces costs, creating 
incentives to increase energy use.  
Macro level studies also report rebound or rebound like effects (Sorrell, 2014, 
Allan et al., 2007, Hanley et al., 2009, Dimitropoulos, 2007). Sakai et al. 
(2019), for example report that energy efficiency has been a key driver of 
economic growth, which in turn creates more income and demand for goods, 
which requires energy use. The issue of rebound also comes up in the EROI 
literature where Murphy et al., refer to it as the ‘growth paradox’.  
The risk from significant rebound effects is that energy efficiency measures 
actually lead to increased energy dependency and making it harder to reduce 
our use of fossil fuels. This is evidenced by studies that report 
complementary relationships between renewable energy use and fossil fuel 
use (Omri and Nguyen, 2014, Kumar et al., 2015). This suggests that without 
substantive changes to our social structure induced energy efficiency 
measures will be insufficient to avoid the EROI or Climate Change, with their 
attendant impacts on productivity. 
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A full treatment of the potential relation between productivity growth and 
climate change is beyond the scope of this review. But we point to work in 
the ecological economics, feminist economics and post/degrowth 
communities which argues that we may need to rethink the basis of the 
economy, and learn to live with fewer, or no productivity gains to avoid 
catastrophic climate change (Jackson, 2019a, Raworth, 2017, Mair, 2019, 
Power, 2004, Ferguson, 2016, Kallis et al., 2012, Nørgård, 2013, Kallis and 
March, 2015, Mair et al., 2018, Nelson and Power, 2018).  
It may seem extreme to suggest that we reduce productivity growth in order 
to avoid climate change. However, the risks of extreme climate change 
scenarios are uncertain, but potentially catastrophic. Modern human 
civilisation, settled societies, agriculture, and capitalism all evolved during 
a period of climatic stability known as the Holocene. Climate change risks 
pushing the climate out of this period of climatic stability by warming the 
climate to temperatures that humans as a species have never lived with 
(Burke et al., 2018). Ecological economists point out that we simply have no 
way of knowing whether an economy that developed under one set of 
climatic conditions can operate under a different set (Raworth, 2017, Mair, 
2019).  
From this perspective, climate change poses an existential threat to society 
as we know it. Consequently, if productivity is lost due to mitigation, this 
may be a price worth paying. Especially as the literature overwhelmingly 
points to a loss of productivity due to climate impacts. If we can transform 
the economy to be stable without productivity growth as conventionally 
measured, the literature suggests that there could even be positive social 
outcomes as well as environmentally beneficial ones (Jackson 2017).  
9.7 Summary and Gaps 
The energy system is a key driver of climate change. Researchers have 
suggested that productivity growth could be impacted by climate change. 
Several recent climate-economy models suggest climate impacts on 
productivity could be an important way in which the economy is impacted 
by climate change, though the estimated size of the effect depends on the 
model used. 
There is a substantial evidence base around one proposed way that climate 
change would reduce labour productivity. Reviewing studies on heat effects 
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on workers we found broad agreement that this was likely to happen. 
However, the evidence base is stronger for manual workers and those 
already in hot climates. 
There is less evidence on the ways that capital may be affected by climate 
change. However, researchers have offered a number of possible 
mechanisms including direct damage from extreme weather and 
abandonment. Better evidenced is the risk of ‘asset stranding’ if we move to 
a low carbon economy. However, the macro-economic implications of 
stranding remain relatively unexplored 
There is a possibility that renewable and low carbon technologies could 
boost productivity growth. This could happen through a dynamic 
investment channel: increased spending on capital intensive energy 
systems could boost productivity growth through Kaldor-Verdoorn effects. 
Likewise, it has been suggested that low carbon technologies offer 
opportunities for learning by doing.  
Finally, we pointed to the literature suggesting that productivity growth is 
itself a driver of climate change. This can be understood as a macro-
economic rebound effect: as we become more productive, this incentivises 
us to use more energy. There is a large literature that is critical of the notion 
of productivity, partially on these grounds.  
 
We suggest the following areas for further research: 
1. Systematic comparison of the theoretical assumptions of different 
climate-economy models with respect to productivity. CGE models 
appear to find small impacts via productivity, while others find much 
more substantial impacts. 
2. Research into the specific mechanisms by which energy capital may 
influence productivity. There is little empirical work on the ways that 
capital may be impacted by climate change or mitigation efforts. 
Transformational strategies to avoid climate change. A substantial body of 
work suggests that productivity growth may be driving climate change. 
Consequently, structural transformation may be required to avoid it. 
 
 
 74 | CUSP WORKING PAPER No 23 
10 | Conclusions  
In this report we have aimed to map and synthesised perspectives on the 
energy-productivity relation from a wide range of disciplines. Researchers 
have proposed a range of links between energy and productivity. However, 
the evidence base supporting (or not) these mechanisms is at best 
incomplete, and empirical results are rarely conclusive.  
In section 2 we introduced key theoretical elements of productivity 
measurement. Although energy measures of productivity are used, their use 
is rare compared to capital and labour. Likewise, productivity research 
focuses almost exclusively on market measures of output. We suggested that 
productivity research would benefit from a broader scope, engaging more 
fully with energy metrics of productivity, and broader output measures. 
In Section 3 we reviewed the literature exploring the long run relationship 
between energy and productivity. Over the long run there is a relationship 
between energy and labour productivity growth. However, there is little 
agreement on the causes of this relationship. 
Many of the mechanisms that could explain a relationship between energy 
and productivity rely on an assumption about whether energy and capital 
are complements or substitutes. We explored this in Section 4, setting out 
the theoretical bases for these claims, and then reviewing the empirical 
evidence. There is no solid empirical basis for any particular relationship 
between energy and capital. The empirical data is inconclusive and 
conflicting, despite having a striking homogeneity in its methods. The 
problems start at a fundamental point in the operationalisation of 
production theory – notably in capital datasets. We recommend a re-
examination of empirical methods used in this area of productivity research. 
There is a large literature looking at links between energy prices and 
productivity (Section 5). We reviewed 4 proposed channels within this 
literature: the potential inflationary effects of energy price rises, effects via 
expectations, adjustment costs, and the marginal productivity of labour.  
Again, we suggest that there are difficulties in proving any of these channels 
or their relative sizes empirically. 
If the channels identified via capital and price do hold, then it may be 
necessary to reduce our dependence on energy (Section 6). In this way we 
will reduce our exposure to energy shocks. Marginal changes appear to be 
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unlikely to sufficient, however, and we recommend future research explores 
the potential for transformational changes in our energy consumption. 
In Section 7 we turned to the quality of energy measured by Energy Return 
on Energy Invested (EROI). The literature suggests that EROI values are 
declining for a wide range of fuels. This could directly affect productivity 
because it means we have to use more energy to obtain the energy we need 
just to maintain current production.  Has also been suggested that EROI may 
be a long run determinant of price, in which case EROI may also impact 
productivity through price channels. However, this latter is less clear in part 
because the link between EROI and price is contingent on the political 
context of energy supply systems. We recommend further work on EROI-
productivity links, particularly how they are mediated by socio-political 
systems. 
Economic structure is a major driver of energy consumption and may 
influence productivity growth. This is particularly pertinent as shifting to a 
service-based economy has been proposed as a way to reduce our 
dependence on energy. However, this is disputed on the grounds that 
increases in demand for services have the potential to drive up overall 
demand, and therefore energy use, even though services have low energy 
intensities. It is also possible that a shift to service-based economies could 
reduce productivity growth. We recommend future work focus on the twin 
challenges of just how services and productivity are linked, and on the social 
structures that drive demand growth in service sector activities, and the link 
with social value. 
Finally, we explored the links between energy and climate change. The 
literature is largely in agreement that climate change, driven by our energy 
system, is likely to damage productivity – though how much this will 
damage the broader economy is disputed. However, the effects that our 
response to climate change will have on productivity is less clear. It could 
lead to substantial productivity loss via stranded assets or could lead to 
productivity growth through investment and innovation. This is a key area 
for further work. There is also a substantial body of work that points to 
productivity growth as a key driver to climate change, and argues for a 
rethinking of productivity growth altogether. We suggest further work in 
this area, to ensure that we are able to meet the potentially existential threat 
of climate change. 
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